Does Trade Promote Peace?

Does trade promote peace? This is a received idea since Montesquieu’s “sweet commerce”. However, we will see that it is rather the opposite.

Does trade promote peace?

Trade promotes peace: the theory of sweet trade

In On the Spirit of Laws , Montesquieu makes the connection between trade and peace:

“The natural effect of commerce is to bring about peace”Montesquieu, of the spirit of the laws

Indeed, trade promotes mutual knowledge, travel, exchanges with others. As a result, he softened morals, both on a political and individual level.

“It is almost a general rule that wherever there are gentle morals, there is commerce, and that wherever there is commerce, there are gentle morals.”Montesquieu, of the spirit of the laws

It also creates mutual interests between nations. If the business elites of country A do business with those of country B (investments, flows), political leaders should be less inclined to break these ties through war. Indeed, political and economic elites are often closely linked, and the wealth provided by trade benefits, in certain cases, both parties.

However, it is very easy to find examples in history of countries closely linked by trade which went to war with each other. The best known is that of the First World War. Trade between France and Germany was very high in 1914, which did not prevent the conflict. So we need to dig deeper to understand the relationship between trade and war.

Trade, wealth, power… and war

Let us start from the postulate that trade is a source of wealth, which allows the increase in the power of the State which controls it. This wealth makes it possible to build or strengthen one’s military capacity: to set up and equip armies and fleets. On this subject, read our article The thalassocratic system in Thucydides.

It is indeed also necessary to protect this source of wealth. The development of war fleets goes hand in hand with that of commerce. We have already talked about Melos , who was forced to confront the Athenians despite its neutrality. Its geographical position would allow anyone who controls it to pose an unacceptable threat to the Athenian economic system . Today, the West is obliged to protect its lines of communication in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks through war .

This last example shows that trade can turn into vulnerability. When a state becomes overly dependent on its trade for supplies and wealth, its lines of communication become a target. This is where France’s maritime strategy came from in the 18th and 19th centuries  . Faced with the superiority of the British squadrons, France fell back on naval warfare. It seeks to hinder British supplies, and to drive up the price of insurance (like today in the Red Sea). On this subject, read chapter 6 of The Measurement of Force .

Trade, one interest among others: it only modestly promotes peace

Trade therefore increases wealth, military capabilities and provides vulnerability to attack. But this does not detract from the relevance of the argument of mutual dependence, however invalidated by historical experience. For what ?

The question to ask is in reality: are there interests greater than those of commerce, which could push political entities to go to war despite strong commercial ties? Asking the question reveals the futility of linking trade and peace. Political interest remains greater than economic interest.

Without reviewing the causes of wars, innumerable and always singular, let us simply note that there are many cases in which a state would have an interest in going to war against another despite strong commercial ties.

Failing to honor one’s alliances has a political cost much greater than the temporary destruction of economic ties. This is a small part of the mechanism that leads to the First World War.

A balance of power with a threatening power on the verge of overthrow. England has long based its policy on the balance of power on the European continent.

Political opportunity: the seizure of a key territory can bring long-term gains far beyond the economic costs of a conflict. This is the calculation made, wrongly, by Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Finally, a marked ideological opposition does not prevent maintaining commercial relations. But the latter will carry no weight if a conflict breaks out between two political entities with incompatible political projects. This is the case with Germany’s expansion at the start of World War II.

NB Many examples centered on Europe and the contemporary period. Do not hesitate to note in the comments other cases where political interest has swept aside economic interest… or the opposite.

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To conclude, does trade promote peace? No, or at least very modestly. Making the agent of peace trade amounts to giving him power that he does not have. Indeed, the political project of a nation does not resolve to maintain good commercial relations with its neighbors or competitors. Commerce and wealth are means to a larger political end. It is according to this political end that wars are declared. The depth of economic ties can therefore only marginally counterbalance the weight of political data.

On the contrary, by its very existence commerce favors war because it is necessary to protect it against its competitors, or because it provides an adversary with an opportunity to influence the political decisions of a nation through violence.

To go further:

On Montesquieu: Catherine Larrère, “Montesquieu and “sweet commerce”: a paradigm of liberalism”,  Cahiers d’histoire. Critical History Review.

On maritime strategy, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Traité de Stratégie, Paris, Economica, 2011 .

Progressive Neoliberalism According to Nancy Fraser

In a 2017 article , Nancy Fraser, an American philosopher, develops the concept of “progressive neoliberalism”.

Progressive Neoliberalism, Nancy Fraser

Her thesis could be summarized as follows. To gain acceptance of the social inequalities it causes, neoliberalism needs an attractive facade. Societal struggles, painless for its model of wealth distribution, provide it. However, these advances in reality only benefit members of minorities who already belong to the dominant class.

The article below is a summary of the first part of Nancy Fraser’s text which you will find here .

Recognition and Distribution

Since the 20th century, capitalism has based its authority on two complementary aspects of justice: distribution and recognition.

Distribution consists of the way in which society will redistribute the wealth and goods it produces. It results in a specific structure of the human community. It therefore has an impact on the division of society into social classes.

Recognition , for its part, organizes social statuses . It determines to whom signs of respect, feelings of inclusion or pride should go.

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Progressive Neoliberalism

Progressive neoliberalism is the unlikely alliance of liberal societal currents, such as feminism, anti-racism or the fight for LGBTQIA+ rights, with the forces of financialized capitalism.

It therefore combines an economic program ( distribution ) based on greater concentration of wealth in the hands of an already established elite, to the detriment of the middle and working classes, with an extension of the rights of minorities.

Societal progressivism ( recognition ) makes a strengthening of the domination of economic elites acceptable. The maneuver consists of giving this brutal economic policy an appearance that arouses support, even avant-garde. 

However, this promise of societal emancipation remains superficial. Environmental injunctions only lead to the carbon market. In France, we could say that feminism only results in inclusive writing. Only members of minorities who possess significant cultural, social and economic capital can break the “glass ceiling”. In short, those who already belong to the dominant class. And “all the others find themselves stuck in the cellar”.


To understand how economic elites are won over by societal progressivism, read our article, The Cancel Culture.

Hegemony of Progressive Neoliberalism

Distribution therefore operates according to the neoliberal paradigm, and recognition is based on societal progressivism. This composition allows progressive neoliberalism to achieve hegemony .

Hegemony is a concept introduced by the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci. The ruling class asserts its power by passing off its vision of the world as the only reasonable one. It thus determines what constitutes “common sense”.

It goes hand in hand with the organization of a “hegemonic bloc”, a disparate coalition of social forces through which the ruling class exercises its power.

In this way, critics of progressive neoliberalism naturally find themselves delegitimized in two ways. If they fight neoliberalism, they are accused of populism. If they oppose societal progressivism, proponents of neoliberalism can label them racist. And because of the proximity of the two currents, the criticism of neoliberalism becomes a criticism of progressivism. The circle is closed and the opponents of neoliberalism muzzled, sent to the margins of public debate.

However, this hegemony will only last for a short time. Indeed, progressive neoliberalism is well suited to urban elites who are educated and well integrated into economic flows. On the other hand, it leaves the rest of the population behind, victims of austerity policies or poorly connected to metropolises. The successes of Trump in the United States or of the far right in Europe show that this model is already cracking.

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Progressive neoliberalism therefore constitutes a paradigm according to which the worsening of economic inequalities is hidden behind the screen of societal struggles. The latter remain painless for the financial elites , and give legitimacy to a redistribution system which would otherwise prove unacceptable.

However, it would be a mistake to conclude that Nancy Fraser rejects the need for societal debates. She is herself involved in the feminist movement. She deplores that these struggles, in their “progressive neoliberalist” form, only benefit minorities who already belong to the dominant class. Indeed, according to her, inequalities of recognition find their source in capitalist economic organization. She therefore actually advocates an alliance between progressives and anti-capitalism (which she calls “populism”) in order to limit social inequalities while advancing societal struggles.

The end of “progressive neoliberal” hegemony may ultimately prove to be the root cause of the political transformation affecting the West. The question is not only to know which distribution system will replace progressive neoliberalism, and on what horizon. It is above all a question of being able to face the “monsters” which will be born in the transition.

“The old world is dying, the new is slow to appear and in this chiaroscuro the monsters emerge”Antonio Gramsci


For a similar thesis, read our article Class struggle or race struggle .

This short summary is only intended to encourage you to read the full article, here . He develops these concepts and applies them to American politics to better understand it.

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Is Iran a Democracy?

Is Iran a democracy?

Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has adopted a political system mixing democratic and theocratic elements. This duality raises the question of the true nature of the Iranian regime. Is Iran a democracy?

A formal democracy, the Iranian political system is in reality subject to the domination of unelected institutions.


A way to discover Iran that is both fun and serious: Marjane Satrapi, Persepolis.

Elected institutions

Iran’s parliament, called the Majlis , is one of the country’s key democratic institutions. It is made up of members elected by the people every four years during legislative elections. The Majlis proposes and adopts laws, and supervises the actions of the government.

However, parliament does not have direct jurisdiction over matters of foreign policy or defense. These areas fall within the sphere of influence of the Supreme Leader and bodies related to national security.

Indeed, the powers of the Majlis are limited by the Supreme Guide and the Council of Guardians. These bodies have the power to reject laws that they deem to be contrary to the Islamic Constitution or the principles of the Islamic Republic. Additionally, the Supreme Leader holds final authority over state affairs. This effectively limits the independence and effectiveness of parliament in certain political decisions.

The President of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also elected by universal suffrage every four years. Although subject to certain limitations by the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, the president holds significant executive powers, particularly in matters of domestic policy.


Read also What is Identity? Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity

Is Iran a democracy? The domination of unelected institutions

Real power in Iran, however, resides in unelected institutions, primarily the Supreme Leader. The Guide, currently Ali Khamenei, is the country’s highest political and religious leader. He is responsible for overseeing all aspects of Iranian politics, including and especially the armed forces and the judiciary.

The concept of Velayat-e Faqih, or the “rule of the religious jurist,” frames Iranian politics. It is the Guide which defines the framework within which the Islamist republic acts. The elected institutions therefore act under the supervision of the guide’s office. This notion gives the Guide superior authority, justified by his knowledge and interpretation of Islamic law. This concentration of power in the hands of a single person calls into question the democratic character of the regime.

The Guardian Council, another unelected institution, also limits Iranian democracy. It is composed of members appointed by the Guide and the head of the judiciary. The council’s task is to verify the conformity of laws with the principles of Islam and the Constitution. Among other functions, it has the function of filtering candidates for elections. It thus limits the choice of voters to candidates approved by those in power.

Human rights in question

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATED

Iran faces widespread international criticism over its human rights situation. The Guide restricts freedoms of expression, assembly and religion. Arbitrary arrests, torture and executions are regular. Human rights defenders, independent journalists and political opponents face persecution, with cases of prolonged detention without fair trial.

The arbitrariness of power and its brutality were at the origin of the riots which shook the country in 2022. The death of a young 22-year-old Kurd, Mahsa Amini, murdered by the moral police after her arrest, had provoked riots across the country. This violence was fueled by frustrations accumulated due to the difficult economic situation, poor governance and human rights violations.

MINORITIES POLITICALLY REPRESENTED, BUT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST

Although religious and ethnic minorities in Iran have some political representation, particularly in parliament, they still face systemic discrimination. Minorities such as Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Azeris regularly complain of political, economic and cultural marginalization. Discriminatory laws and restrictive policies often limit their access to employment opportunities, education and public services. Despite their presence within political institutions, these minorities continue to struggle for equal recognition and genuine representation in all aspects of Iran’s social and political life.

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Is Iran a democracy? Although Iran has some elected democratic institutions, unelected institutions largely dominate the country’s political system. The Supreme Leader holds the reality of power. Iranian democracy can only be deployed within a restricted framework determined by the Guide. It is a combination of formal democracy, theocracy and very real authoritarianism.

Biography of Carl von Clausewitz

A short biography of Carl von Clausewitz to complete our articles on “On War”.

Carl von Clausewitz biography
Carl Von Clausewitz

The Beginnings of a Brilliant Strategist

Carl von Clausewitz was born on June 1, 1780, in Burg bei Magdeburg, Prussia, into a family of the minor nobility. His early entry into the Prussian army at the age of 12 marked the beginning of a promising military career. His time at the Berlin Military Academy shaped his convictions, as he was influenced by the revolutionary ideals of France.

On the Battlefield

Carl von Clausewitz was shaped by the Napoleonic Wars. His presence on the European battlefields profoundly influenced his understanding of war and its implications.

At Jena, the Prussian army suffered a crushing defeat against the Napoleonic forces. Clausewitz witnessed the brutal collapse of a military institution he had sworn to serve. This experience confronted him with the ruthless reality of modern warfare.

His participation in the Battle of Waterloo as a Prussian staff officer allowed him to closely observe Napoleon Bonaparte’s strategy and contribute to the French emperor’s final defeat.

These battlefield experiences deeply influenced his strategic thinking. It was in the carnage of war that Clausewitz began to develop the fundamental concepts that would shape his major work, “On War”.

In Service of the Tsar

Following the fall of Prussia, Clausewitz joined Tsar Alexander I of Russia. His commitment to the tsar reflected his growing reputation as a military strategist. This period of his life was marked by efforts to modernize the Russian army. He also advised the tsar on military strategy.

After the War: Development of Clausewitzian Thought

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz dedicated a significant part of his life to furthering his reflection on war and military strategy. He wrote several works and articles that enriched his thinking and expanded his influence. However, his most famous work remains “On War”, albeit unfinished at his death.

Clausewitz‘s Legacy

Clausewitz died of cholera on November 16, 1831, in Breslau, Silesia, at the age of 51. He left behind a lasting legacy in the field of military strategy. His thinking continues to inspire future generations in their understanding of war and international politics. He undoubtedly occupies a place among the greatest military thinkers in history.

Marie von Clausewitz

In conclusion of our biography of Clausewitz, a word about Marie von Clausewitz. Carl’s devoted wife played an essential role in preserving and disseminating her husband’s ideas after his death. Indeed, after Carl’s passing, she took charge of the posthumous publication of “On War”, an unfinished work. Her dedication to spreading Clausewitz’s ideas contributed to solidifying his place among the greatest military thinkers of all time.

After Clausewitz Biography

Also read War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means

Melos or the Risk of Neutrality

The fate of the island of Melos in the Peloponnesian War illustrates the risk to the weak of believing they can remain neutral when the fighting is raging all around them.

Melos or the risk of neutrality

In Book V of the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides presents a dialogue between Athenian ambassadors and Melian notables (V, 84), known as the Melian dialogue, or the dialogue between Athenians and Melians.

Melos is a small island in the Aegean Sea. Its location would allow whoever ruled it to act effectively on maritime traffic. It was therefore a key position for Athens, which depended on the tribute paid by its allies (see our article The thalassocratic system in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War). The city chose to remain neutral in the war that had been raging between Sparta and Athens for 15 years.

Mélos ou les risques de la neutralité - L'empire athénien en 431 av. J.-C., juste avant le début de la guerre du Péloponnèse.
The Athenian Empire in 431 BC, just before the start of the Peloponnesian War. Map_athenian_empire_431_BC-fr.svg : Marsyasderivative work: Once in a Blue Moon, CC BY-SA 2.5, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5, via Wikimedia Commons

In 416 BC, the Athenians felt that the neutrality of this small city represented too great a risk and decided to give it an ultimatum: submit to the Empire or see their city destroyed. After all, the Melians are also Sparta’s colonists. An edifying dialogue ensues between Athenian delegates and Melian notables.

Melos’ neutrality rejected

Melos offered to remain neutral. This argument was immediately rejected by the Athenians.

“your hostility does us less harm than your friendship: the latter would appear in the eyes of the peoples of the empire as proof of weakness, your hatred as proof of power”.

Athens based its power on the tribute it received from its subjugated cities. It therefore had to ensure that it dominated the sea routes. If it accepted that Melos should remain neutral, it opened the door to demands from other island peoples.

The heart of the Melian dialogue: right versus possible

The Athenian delegates began by dismissing the legal argument.

“we’re not going to […] use big words, saying that having defeated the Mede gives us the right to dominate, or that our current campaign stems from an infringement of our rights”.

They intend to rely on power relationships.

“If the law intervenes in human assessments to inspire a judgement when the forces are equivalent, the possible, on the other hand, governs the action of the strongest and the acceptance of the weakest”.

For the Melians, it’s submission or death, whatever their legal position. “Either we prevail in terms of the law, refusing to give in, and it’s war, or […] it’s servitude”.

Destruction of Melos

Strengthened by their right and the divine support that goes with it, the Melians chose to resist despite the power of Athens. They counted on Sparta to come to their aid.

“In the name of their own interests, they will not want to betray Melos, a colony of their own, in order to become suspect to their supporters in Greece and do their enemies a favour.

But Sparta did not make a move. After all, Melos never took their side. Melos’ position was irrational.

“Your strongest support comes from a hope for the future, and your present resources are meagre to successfully resist the forces now arrayed against you”.

After several months of siege, Melos, starving, tried to negotiate its surrender. But the Athenians proved implacable. They subjected the city to extreme violence, even for the time. They slaughtered the men, took the women and children into slavery, and then brought in their own colonists. The fate of Melos left a lasting impression on the Greek world. Because it thought it was choosing honour, relying on neutrality and help of a power that was culturally close to it, it ceased to exist.

Right, morality and power

What conclusion is to be drawn from the Melian dialogue? Not that might makes right. But that despite the rule of law, power relationships do not disappear. They must be taken into account. Morality carries little weight in the face of what a player perceives to be his vital interest. And like promises, alliances are only binding on those who believe them.


Read also Ares and Athena, Gods of War

Who are the Houthis ?

Yemen has been the scene of complex conflicts and political upheavals. At the heart of this tumult are the Houthis, a rebel group that has emerged as a major player on the Yemeni political scene.

Houthis

Today, the Houthis control a large part of Yemeni territory, including the major port of Hodeïda. Their economic and military power enables them to keep the internationally recognized government at bay.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthis are a political and religious movement from northern Yemen, in the Saada region. Founded in the late 1990s by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, the movement takes its name from the Houthi family. They still play a central role in the movement’s decision-making. Initially, the Houthis were a Zaydi movement, a branch of Shiism. They subsequently evolved into a political and military force capable of competing with the government.

Their rise to power has been fueled by a mixture of political, economic and religious grievances. Indeed, the Houthis opposed the political and economic marginalization of Yemen’s northern regions. They criticized the central government for its corruption and alignment with foreign powers, notably Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Houthi ideology

Their ideology is imbued with strong anti-imperialist and anti-American sentiment, as well as fervent Yemeni nationalism. The Houthis have also adopted a religious discourse, presenting themselves as defenders of the interests of the Zaydites and the oppressed against outside forces and corrupt elites.

The Houthis belong to the Zaydi branch of Shi’ism, one of the main schools of thought in Shi’ite Islam. Zaydism is widespread mainly in Yemen, where it makes up the majority of the population in the northern regions.

This branch of Shi’ism is distinguished by its interpretation of the succession of the Prophet Muhammad and its emphasis on social and political justice. The Zaydites believe that an Imam descended directly from the Prophet Muhammad should lead the Muslim community. He must be chosen on the basis of merit and piety, rather than dynastic lineage.

Although the Houthis are strongly rooted in the Zaydi tradition, their discourse and actions go far beyond religious issues to encompass broader political and social concerns.

Abd el Malek Al Houthi, the charismatic leader of the Houthis, embodies this fusion of religiosity and political commitment. His followers revere him as both a religious leader and a political guide. He unites the two dimensions of authority in the Zaydi tradition. His speeches are imbued with religious references and Koranic verses. They reinforce his status as a spiritual leader while articulating a political vision for Yemen.

The Houthis in a position of strength in Yemen

Yemen has been in the grip of civil war since 2014. The Houthis took control of the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. They overthrew the Saudi-backed government and forced the Yemeni president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, into exile. Since then, Yemen has been plunged into a violent and devastating conflict, exacerbated by the military intervention of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in support of Hadi’s government.

The Houthis have succeeded in resisting the Arab coalition’s offensives and consolidating their hold on large swathes of Yemeni territory, including Sana’a and other key regions. Their stubborn resistance and ability to mobilize broad popular support have enabled them to remain a key political player despite international pressure and coalition attempts to oust them from power.

Houthi-controlled zone in Yemen (2022)
Houthi-controlled zone in Yemen (2022)

Today, they have considerable military power. The Houthis are not a rag-tag rebellion. On the contrary, they have taken over the resources, weapons and know-how of the regular army in the areas they control. Some of the military personnel who served the regime have been transferred to the Houthis as part of their territorial conquests. They simply need to feed their families. Today, the Houthis are capable of producing and deploying sophisticated weaponry. What’s more, they benefit from the support of Iran. The port of Hodeïda also provides them with substantial revenue. This enables them to sustain their war effort.

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The Houthis continue to play a central role in Yemeni politics, defying the expectations and forecasts of many international observers. Their meteoric rise and resilience in the face of external pressures testify to the complexity and depth of the political and social dynamics shaping the contemporary Yemeni landscape.


What is Identity? Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity

What is identity? In In the Name of Identity (Les identités meurtrières), novelist Amin Maalouf offers us his analysis. He sets out to understand why, all over the world, people kill in the name of their identity.

Amin Maalouf

Identity as the sum of feelings of belonging

So, what is identity? It’s what makes me identical to no one else. It’s made up of different feelings of belonging, each uniquely combined. These include class, skin color, religion, language, nationality, country of birth… The individual experiences these distinct feelings of belonging as a whole.

Amin Maalouf notes that we also have to deal with a dual heritage. The vertical heritage is that of our forebears. Our families and friends pass on habits and traditions to us. The horizontal heritage is that of our contemporaries. We live in an era with its own way of life and vision of the world. It’s this heritage that has the greatest impact on our behavior.

Identity is not innate, but acquired. It is “constructed and transformed throughout life”. For example, being born black does not have the same meaning in Zambia as it does in the United States. Religion will not have the same importance in your identity if you grow up in France, Iraq or India. The influence of others is therefore of key importance in the development of identity.

Indeed, this influence is at the root of the perception of feelings of belonging and their hierarchization. Their origin lies in the wounds caused by the differences highlighted by others. We tend to recognize ourselves in the most attacked of our belongings.

Nevertheless, the hierarchy of feelings of belonging can evolve over time. A person who in the ’80s claimed to be primarily Yugoslav may in the ’90s have felt primarily Muslim. Nowadays, he or she is more likely to identify with the Bosnian nation.

Religion and identity

All over the world today, and particularly in the Arab world, men and women are focusing on their religious affiliation.

Religion satisfies two needs: the need for spirituality and the need to belong. But for many, faith is the core of their identity.

This can be explained by the end of communist models in Europe and nationalist models in the Arab world, but also by the fact that the West doubts itself.

The religious paradigm therefore remains the only credible political offering in the Arab world today. As a result, religion has become the key component of identity. Yet this return to religion is a historically limited phenomenon, caused by essentially political factors.


Read also Lucien Poirier’s « Comprehensive Strategy »

“Tribal” concepts of identity

It may be tempting to consider that one belonging dominates all others and imposes itself as identity. However, reducing an individual to an essential identity reduces relations with others to “us” versus “them”. Those who wish to take account of all feelings of belonging are then considered traitors or lukewarm.

When this “tribal” identity is attacked, solidarity sets in among those who share this sense of belonging. The conviction of self-defense takes root in communities where only the most determined leaders can make themselves heard. This is the mechanism that leads to identity-based violence and deadly identities.

Globalization and identity

These identity-related relationships are exacerbated by globalization. Globalization is characterized by the faster circulation of knowledge than its creation. Humanity is therefore moving towards a globalized society that is less and less differentiated. We have more and more things in common, and this encourages us to assert our diversity.

It is also accompanied by anxiety about sudden change. Recourse to identity enhancement is a response to this anxiety. In short, the more self-confident and dynamic a society is, the more capable it will be of opening up to others. The more it feels at risk, the more it will protect itself with its identity reflex.

In this context, the relationship of non-Western societies to progress encourages such a withdrawal reflex. Indeed, modernity is associated with the conquering West. Accepting it means abandoning a part of one’s identity, such as ancestral know-how. When modernity bears the mark of the other, archaism becomes a banner.

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Ultimately, what is identity, according to Amin Maalouf? An individual’s identity lies in the sum of his or her feelings of belonging. These feelings are acquired, not innate. Globalization is exacerbating them, in response to societal standardization and the rapid spread of new knowledge.

Reducing identity to an essential sense of belonging is a mechanism that brings strong political gains, but also proves particularly dangerous. Only the acceptance of others in all the dimensions of their identity will enable dialogue, and hence criticism.


Read also Ares and Athena, Gods of War

War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means

Fetish, totem, stroke of genius, Clausewitz’s “formula” – “war is nothing but the mere continuation of politics by other means” – is sometimes praised, sometimes reviled by strategists.

Carl von Clausewitz
War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means

We’ve come to the end of our Clausewitzian journey. Please feel free to read our other articles on the concepts introduced by the master in On War. We advise you to read the one on absolute war before continuing.

It’s time to confront this monument.

War is subject to politics

Clausewitz opens De la guerre with the ambition of analyzing the phenomenon of war. “We propose to examine war first in each of its elements, then in each of its parts, and finally in its entirety, that is, in the connection these parts have with each other”.

Logically, then, the discussion begins with a proposed definition. “War is therefore an act of force by which we seek to compel our adversary to submit to our will”.

Notion of political goal

The use of force – and violence – is therefore by definition inseparable from war. But for Clausewitz, force is merely a means to a political end.

However, the only way to achieve this political goal is “to put the enemy in no position to defend himself” (p. 28). The political goal can therefore only be achieved through a military objective.

If the use of armed force is the means to a political end, then war is subject to politics. This is one of the major theses of the work. It is also one of the meanings of Clausewitz’s formula, war as the continuation of politics by other means.

War is subject to politics

War does not impose its logic on politics. “It is therefore the political goal […] that determines the result to be achieved by military action, and the efforts to be devoted to it”.

The only requirement for war is that the political objective be compatible with the use of armed force. Clausewitz was not the theorist of total war, in which political reason would have to give way to the imperatives of war (that was Ludendorff).

On the other hand, the amount of effort required (i.e., the level at which the military goal is set) to achieve the political goal depends on the pre-existing relations between the belligerents. For example (this example is ours, and does not appear in the work), conquering a neighboring province may well be done without a blow, if it’s just a matter of the population concerned changing tyrants. But if people’s passions have already been aroused, this conquest can lead to a long and cruel war. The form of war changes, but not the political objective.

War and politics are therefore of the same nature. There is no break between them, despite the introduction of force. War is the means to a political end: it is simply its continuation. Politics does not cease with the use of arms.

The meaning of the formula

Strictly speaking, the “formula” is not a definition of war. Rather, it is a characterization. The starting point of Clausewitz’s analytical approach is the identification of two dominant features of warfare.

What is the “policy” in question?

The restrictive point of view

For Martin Van Creveld, in The Transformation of War, Clausewitz understands politics to mean only relations between states based on rational interests and calculations. The formula would then be unable to account for the participation of non-state groups in war, or for conflicts in which one side is fighting for its survival.

Clearly, it would not have had such a following if the term “politics” had to be understood in such a restricted sense.

Human communities

Of course, in On War, Clausewitz concentrates on wars between or within states. And with good reason: these were the only wars he knew of. However, when he describes the essence of war in Book One, he does seem to take into account the possibility of political conflicts outside the state. “Between human communities, and especially between civilized nations, war always arises from a political situation and pursues a political goal”.

Unsurprisingly, Clausewitz sees the nation – and in this case the state – as a “civilized” form of human organization. But he also envisages the existence of other types of organization, other types of “human communities”.

We will therefore define “politics” as the ways in which human communities cohabit and live together. N.B.: this is our definition. It does not appear in the work.

The struggle for survival and the disappearance of political purpose

Clausewitz also considered struggles for survival, as opposed to “political” wars fought for “interests”.

He noted that wars can vary in intensity, from wars of extermination to wars waged for cold interests. He recognizes that their relationship to politics seems, at first glance, to differ according to this intensity.

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“The more extensive and powerful the motives that lead to war, the more tense the political situation that precedes it, the more the existence of the peoples taking part in it is engaged, and the closer war itself comes to its abstract form […] and seems to withdraw from the authority of politics to follow only its own laws: the military goal and the political objective become identical. But on the other hand, the weaker the motives that preside over war and the tensions that precede it, the further the political goal deviates from the outburst of violence inherent in war, so that, obliged to deviate from its natural direction in order to conform to the one imposed upon it, war […] finally comes to seem exclusively an instrument of politics.”

On War, emphasis added.

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However, this disappearance of the political goal behind the military objective is only apparent. “All wars must be considered as political acts”, he asserts a few lines further on.

If political and military aims become confused, one does not absorb the other. A war of extermination is also a political act, albeit an extreme one: it appears legitimate and necessary to at least one of the two sides.

So what are these “other means”?

Clausewitz’s answer would be immediate: violence, bloodshed. It is one of the intrinsic characteristics of war. “In order to define war without becoming too heavy-handed, we shall confine ourselves to what constitutes its primordial element: combat”. Violence is thus an extraordinary means for politics to achieve its ends.

For Clausewitz, war without violence and combat is an illusion. “According to some philanthropists, there is some artificial method which, without bloodshed, would make it possible to disarm or reduce the adversary […]. […]. However generous this idea may be, it is nonetheless an error to be combated”.

These two elements lead us to recompose Clausewitz’s characterization of war, to propose a definition of war that seems to us to be in line with his formula. War is an armed and bloody confrontation between human groups, with the aim of forcibly modifying their common modes of existence, including through annihilation.

The question now is whether this definition stands up to criticism, and whether it is of any use in dealing with the phenomenon of war.

Can war not be political in nature?

Let’s subject this definition to an intellectual bombardment and try to refute it.

Seemingly non-political reasons for war

The motives for war can be diverse: political, of course, but also religious, legal, cultural, economic… How can war not therefore be of a non-political nature?

Clearly, most conflicts can be described as “political”, in the sense of our definition. A war to impose trade terms on another party, such as the opium wars (this was obviously not the only motive for these wars), falls well within our definition of cohabitation terms.

The same applies to wars waged for legal or moral reasons. Legal institutions and concepts, whatever the era, set in stone the relationships that communities must have with each other. As for imposing moral imperatives through war, this remains the imposition of a norm on the adversary.

Religious conflicts are also political

Religious conflict is also a political conflict, even if this may seem counter-intuitive. Imagine a conflict whose motivations are purely spiritual. This type of conflict is probably an impossibility, so numerous, diverse and profound are the reasons behind a war. But let’s imagine a purely religious war.

Several belligerents clash over the validity of their understanding of a religious (or philosophical) doctrine. It’s a question of day-to-day ways of living and cohabiting. So it’s already politics. The winning side will have succeeded in forcibly imposing its way of believing on the vanquished. It will have redefined the terms of cohabitation with its opponents.

Finally, it has been suggested that the wars waged by the Aztecs against their neighbors were not political. Rather, they were religious in nature. Indeed, their sole purpose was to take captives and sacrifice them to the gods. However, the real question settled by the war was who should provide the supplicants. Once a village had been subjugated, it owed a certain number of individuals to be sacrificed as tribute. While the motive for war was indeed religious (to take captives), its nature remained political. The aim was to create and maintain a system of domination between human groups.

Wars for honor?

But what about honor? An armed conflict between human groups motivated by honor would not qualify as war today. It would be considered a vendetta, or a cycle of violence. It seems inconceivable to us that two political entities would go to war over a question of honor.

However, in other societies, other cultures, other times, this notion is quite conceivable. Two groups could clash over an act perceived as unacceptable in the value system in question. In any event, armed confrontation would then take place, not to define the terms of coexistence, but with the aim of correcting an imbalance introduced into cohabitation between the groups by one of the parties. In this sense, it remains possible – albeit at the extreme limit – to conclude that this armed violence is political in nature.

Nevertheless, the conflict could not have a political objective. It would be a matter of defeating the other to an undefined extent, up to the point where equilibrium is deemed to be re-established and acceptable to the parties to the conflict.

War as culture

As a final analysis, the only circumstance in which war might not be political is if it is a culture.

This is not a conflict of cultures, in the sense of one side trying to impose its culture on the other by force. That would fall within our definition of politics. We’re talking about war as culture, as a way of life.

According to John Keegan in Histoire de la guerre, the strength of the cavalry peoples of the steppes was to have war as a way of life. In other words, they lived solely for and through combat. This position probably needs to be qualified. However, if war can be a way of life for an entire people (as distinct from a mere profession), then it is not necessarily a continuation of politics. It does not redefine the modalities of cohabitation, because it is the only possible way to cohabit. It is politics.

The Clausewitzian presupposition

If war remains political in nature, it no longer serves to resolve a conflict. This exposes the Clausewitzian presupposition, which lies not in the political nature of war, but in “other means”. Basically, Clausewitz sees war as a violent means of resolving a conflict between two human groups.

In this sense, although it cannot be detached from politics, war has no other purpose than its own disappearance in favor of a new, recognized political order. By its very nature, war is a transitory state of politics. If, on the other hand, organized armed violence is not a means, but a culture, it ceases to be a means and loses its transitory character, becoming a state of equilibrium.

However, the fact that war can be a culture is only a hypothesis, an intellectual construct. Today, no people on earth possesses this war-culture.*


Read also Clausewitz’s center of gravity

Structuring the treatment of organized armed violence

Clearly, not all organized armed violence is political, and not all violence is organized. Clausewitz’s formula clearly delimits the perimeter of war within that of violence. Without this political dimension, any confrontation between gangs could be described as war.

The notion of politics makes it possible to distinguish, within organized armed violence, between what is war and what is not.

Organized crime

Let’s consider criminals, who act in organized gangs either against their rivals or against the established order. When they act for pecuniary reasons (robbing vans, murdering rivals…), nobody would dream of talking about war.

But when it comes to deciding pre-eminence between gangs, or determining who controls a territory, the violence takes on a political dimension. The term “gang war” comes to mind, and rightly so.

The case is even more eloquent when it comes to organized resistance to the forces of law and order in order to maintain the parallel administration of a territory. This is the case of certain battles waged by Mexican cartels against the police. What we have here is a war stricto sensu.

Criminal means and political claims

Conversely, if an organization uses criminal means to further its political cause, it is legitimate to speak of war. Hostage-taking by a group whose sole aim is to profit from the ransom cannot be considered an act of war. On the other hand, if the hostage-taking is used to finance violent actions aimed at altering the political balance of power, or simply to assert a political position, then it is indeed an act of war, however illegitimate it may be in the Western conception of war.

The notion of politics makes it possible to distinguish which armed, organized and bloody acts of violence should be qualified as war.

The point here is not to enter into a circular reasoning that would explain that since war is political, apolitical violence is not war, which would prove that war is political. It is to show that Clausewitz’s formula, according to which war is the continuation of politics by other means, makes it possible to structure the perception of organized armed violence, and to put in place appropriate responses.

Contemporary applications

So, how can this formula help us understand war?

If, as Clausewitz thought, war is the continuation of politics by other means, then we can avoid two pitfalls in which the common perception of war today in the West seems to be caught.

Repoliticizing war

Firstly, war is not just a matter of technique or performance. Western countries may have tended to consider that the deployment and use of armed force were capable of winning a war thanks to their formidable capacity to kill, before being astonished at having to wage eternal wars against an enemy who was constantly being destroyed. Their poor counter-insurgency record is a result of the perception of war as a phenomenon unrelated to politics.

Indeed, the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces is necessary to bring down the will of the state. But what can the capacity for destruction achieve when the enemy is no longer a state? The adversary in asymmetrical warfare is made up of individuals who have deemed their living conditions unacceptable, to the point of risking their lives fighting against the established order. As long as the political conditions that set the insurrection in motion do not change, it is illusory to hope for any kind of victory. Between states, the political conditions of conflict change as the military balance of power changes, not in asymmetrical warfare.

Non-military levers of action

What’s more, when the balance of power is asymmetrical, military action cannot have a decisive effect. What other political or economic levers do Western democracies have at their disposal to influence the course of their foreign wars? Economic leverage is limited to the imposition of liberalism, tinged with development aid. Political leverage is limited to organizing elections. If war is indeed too serious a matter to be left to the military, then non-military means of action must also exist.

Finally, presenting armed intervention as a technical solution to a strategic problem, or worse, a moral problem, does not allow us to give our adversary his due. They are reduced to the rank of terrorists or criminals. And we negotiate with neither. Without putting politics back at the heart of warfare, there can be no peace, only long wars and defeat.

Economic, commercial and information warfare

Secondly, by placing bloodshed at the heart of warfare, we can better understand the mechanism of international relations, by distinguishing war from what General Poirier called “competitive commerce”.

Indeed, today there are countless speeches on “economic warfare”, “information warfare”, “trade warfare” and “cyberwarfare”. And yet, if we judge these “wars” by the yardstick of our definition and formula, the term is misused.

So what is the point of these misuses? An attempt to understand a state of tension that seems incompatible with a state of peace. In Stratégie théorique II, General Poirier explains that competition between the political projects of different socio-political players leads to a state of perpetual tension, which he calls “competitive commerce”.

Economic or information “wars” are in fact consubstantial with international relations and the state of peace. Perceiving them as wars can only cloud judgment and lead to irrational, counter-productive decisions.
Adding an adjective after “war” gives the impression of a fine analysis, or even a conceptual breakthrough. However, it often only adds to the confusion, both in understanding the phenomenon of war – which is by nature changeable, like the famous chameleon – and in understanding the state of peace. The latter is nothing more than a harsh competition, distinguished from war only by bloodshed.

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Clausewitz’s famous formula, “War is only the continuation of politics by other means”, is often attacked, but never dethroned. It is a simple phrase that reminds us that war is political in nature. It is not, therefore, an autonomous phenomenon. Finally, it is characterized by organized armed violence and bloodshed.

It gives us a clearer picture of today’s world. But it also allows us to draw up safeguards delimiting what it can achieve, and above all, what it cannot do.


“War is merely the continuation of politics by other means”.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chap. 1, § 24.

Read also Understanding Clausewitz’s Trinity

Ares and Athena, Gods of War

In Canto V of the Iliad, Homer stages the confrontation between Ares and Athena. Both are gods of war, but in different ways.

Gods of war

Diomedes, one of the Greek chiefs, is supported by Athena. He wreaks havoc on the Trojan camp, even wounding Aphrodite and challenging Apollo, who are fighting for the other side. Ares then intervenes on the Trojan side to repel the Achaeans. Athena urges Diomedes to defeat Ares. Two deities, each representing a different aspect of the war, collide.

Ares, “madman”, “scourge of mankind”, “tainted with murder”, is the god of war in its aspect of blind violence and devastation. He pounces on Diomedes as soon as he sees him, eager to take his life.

But Athena, goddess of strategy and intelligence in war, deflects Ares’ hand. She guides Diomedes’ spear straight at his adversary, who, wounded, must leave the battlefield and return to Olympus.

What does this passage from the Iliad and the gods of war tell us about the use of force?

Intelligence has triumphed over force and rage. It is intelligence that directs efforts to produce the right effect at the right time. It is intelligence that deflects the opponent’s strike to prevent it from being effective.

Conversely, violence that is not channeled towards a goal by intelligence is nothing but barbarism, incapable of achieving any political result. Force therefore solves nothing by itself; it is the direction given by intelligence that gives it its power.


Read also Why general culture is the true school of command – Charles De Gaulle

Why general culture is the true school of command – Charles De Gaulle

In Vers l’armée de métier (1934), Charles de Gaulle explains, with a formula that has remained famous, that general culture is the real school of command. According to him, it is necessary to train the “power of the mind”, and the “intellectual and moral reflexes of leaders”. But in this work, he hardly constructs his thought except on a few pages.

De Gaulle. General Culture true school of command.
Charles de Gaulle (1890 – 1970). Officer, writer, head of state.

He had been much more prolific in The edge of the sword (Le fil de l’épée, 1932). We will use these developments to understand his idea. We will also explain what qualities he thinks a military leader should possess.

Intelligence, instinct, general culture

For Charles de Gaulle, intelligence and instinct are both necessary to action.

War is such a complex domain, involving so many immaterial forces, that it is difficult to grasp it entirely by intelligence. However, even if it does not bring certainty, the intellect reduces the field of error. It brings intelligence, organization, knowledge of its strengths and weaknesses. It “prepares the conception of the action but does not give birth to it”.

Intelligence is complemented by instinct. It is through instinct that man “perceives the reality of the conditions which surround him and experiences the corresponding impulse”. Instinct is a shortcut between the sensible world and action. “Great men of war have always been aware of the role and the value of instinct. »

It is general culture that forms intelligence and instinct. It allows one to structure its thoughts and prepare its mind for decision-making, by clearing the field of possibilities. Substitute to experience, it is also much broader. It is for this reason that according to de Gaulle, “the true school of command is therefore General Culture” , and that “at the bottom of Alexander’s victories, one always finds Aristotle”.

However, general culture is not everything. A military leader needs many other qualities.

Authority

After conception, decision. Authority and courage, moral qualities, complement intelligence and instinct, intellectual qualities, in the great leader.

Decision-making is a moral process, not an intellectual one. It requires courage. Courage is not given to everyone, because of the serious consequences that the decision to be taken may entail. The mind capable of decision must also be accompanied by authority, which is the faculty of having “a grip on souls”.

Authority itself implies “prestige“. Prestige (here similar to charisma) is an innate gift, but certain aspects of it can be developed .

To work on his prestige, the commander must remain mysterious, which requires distancing himself from its subordinates. But this prestige is not inaccessibility, it is the reserve of the soul, of gestures and words, the sobriety of attitude and speech. One must feel in the silence of the leader the contained flame. It is an attitude of a king in exile.

But to maintain what must be called “majesty” (the term does not appear in the book), the leader needs a goal that connects him to greatness. However, greatness represents a weight that cannot be supported by everyone.

Finally, to the virtues of intelligence, instinct and prestige, the great leader has to add character .

The character

Character, “ virtue of difficult times “is the ability to leave its mark on facts.

The man of character inspires, decides and assumes. He has the “ passion of willing”. He is firm, but benevolent, assumes the failures and redistributes the glory. In times of peace, such a man will be perceived as proud and unruly, and he will suffer for it. But let difficulties arise, and they will naturally push him to the fore.

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If “the true school of command is therefore General Culture”, it is because that it prepares the commander for rapid and fair decision-making in the face of an unforeseeable and necessarily confuse situation . It develops the instinct which, alone, makes it possible to feel the direction to give to its choices. But if the general culture forms the instinct of the military leader, the latter must be accompanied by other qualities such as intelligence or authority, both moral and intellectual.

“All great men of action were meditative”

CHARLES DE GAULLE, LE FIL DE L’ÉPÉE.

“The real school of command is therefore general culture. Through it thought is enabled to exercise itself with order, to discern in things the essential from the incidental, to perceive the extensions and the interference, in short to rise to that degree where the ensembles appear without prejudice of nuances. Not an illustrious captain who did not have taste and sense for heritage and human spirit. At the bottom of Alexander’s victories, one always finds Aristotle. »

CHARLES DE GAULLE, VERS L’ARMÉE DE MÉTIER.

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Also read Lucien Poirier’s Comprehensive Strategy.