God of War, War gods


Many cultures have their own god of war, but this function is often tied to other roles. This shows us how each culture perceives war. Here’s an overview of the main war gods from different cultures around the world. The list is, of course, not exhaustive.

Doyen – Mars Wounded by Diomedes – 1781
Doyen – Mars Wounded by Diomedes – 1781

War gods in Africa

Ogun (West Africa, mainly among the Yoruba). Ogun is the god of war, iron, and hunting. He is also linked to technology and industry. He is the patron of blacksmiths and symbolizes both violence and justice.

Gu (Benin, among the Fon). He is often associated with Ogun but also represents strength, metallurgy, and destruction.

Sekhmet (Ancient Egypt) is a goddess of war, destruction, and healing in Egyptian mythology. She appears in the form of a lioness, symbolizing her ferocity in battle. According to myths, Ra, the sun god, sent her to punish humanity, and she nearly wiped out humanity in her rage. However, she is also a healer, capable of curing diseases, making her a complex deity, embodying both war and healing.

Sekhmet (Ancient Egypt) is a goddess of war, destruction, and healing in Egyptian mythology. She appears in the form of a lioness, symbolizing her ferocity in battle. According to myths, Ra, the sun god, sent her to punish humanity, and she nearly wiped out humanity in her rage. However, she is also a healer, capable of curing diseases, making her a complex deity, embodying both war and healing.

Western Europe: tension between brutality and intelligence

Greek and Roman mythology

Ares (Ancient Greece). God of brutal war, violence, and destruction, Ares embodies the wild side of conflict. He is associated with bloody and disorganized battle.

Ares (Ancient Greece). God of brutal war, violence, and destruction, Ares embodies the wild side of conflict. He is associated with bloody and disorganized battle.

Athena (Ancient Greece). Goddess of wisdom but also of strategy and intelligence in war. Athena symbolizes just war, protection, and military strategy.

Athena (Ancient Greece). Goddess of wisdom but also of strategy and intelligence in war. Athena symbolizes just war, protection, and military strategy.

Mars (Ancient Rome). Inspired by Ares, Mars is the god of war but also a protector of fields and agriculture. Rome venerates him as a god of military power and honor.

Mars (Ancient Rome). Inspired by Ares, Mars is the god of war but also a protector of fields and agriculture. Rome venerates him as a god of military power and honor.

Gaul

Teutates (Gaul). In Celtic religion, Teutates is one of the three main gods mentioned by Roman sources, often compared to Mars. He is a protector god of tribes and warriors, invoked in warrior rituals. Some human sacrifices were offered to him before battles.

Camulos (Gaul). Another Celtic god of war, Camulos is revered in Gaul and Great Britain. He is often compared to Mars and is depicted with military symbols of power.

Sucellos (Gaul). While generally seen as a god of fertility and blacksmiths, Sucellos also has warrior aspects, particularly as the wielder of the mallet, a symbol of strength and destructive power.

Astérix and Obélix (France). Astérix and Obélix are the two major warrior figures of the French pantheon. Always invoked at the start of battles involving French troops, they continue to inspire strategists and warriors. They fear only one thing: that the sky will fall on their heads.

Astérix and Obélix (France). Astérix and Obélix are the two major warrior figures of the French pantheon. Always invoked at the start of battles involving French troops, they continue to inspire strategists and warriors. They fear only one thing: that the sky will fall on their heads.

Norse mythology

Thor (Norse mythology) is the god of thunder, lightning, and protection in Norse mythology, but he also plays an important role as a war god. While Odin and Týr are more specifically associated with war, Thor is often invoked by warriors for his unmatched strength and destructive power. He fights giants, enemies of the gods, and protects humanity with his famous hammer, Mjölnir. He represents bravery, raw power, and the defense of order against chaos.

Thor (Norse mythology) is the god of thunder, lightning, and protection in Norse mythology, but he also plays an important role as a war god. While Odin and Týr are more specifically associated with war, Thor is often invoked by warriors for his unmatched strength and destructive power. He fights giants, enemies of the gods, and protects humanity with his famous hammer, Mjölnir. He represents bravery, raw power, and the defense of order against chaos.


Odin (Norse mythology). Although he is a god of wisdom, Odin is often invoked by Viking warriors to guide them in battle.

Odin (Norse mythology). Although he is a god of wisdom, Odin is often invoked by Viking warriors to guide them in battle.

Opposite: the Norse god Odin enthroned, flanked by his two wolves, Geri and Freki, and his two ravens, Huginn and Muninn, and holding his spear Gungnir.

Týr (Norse mythology). Týr is the god of courage, honor, and war. He symbolizes war as an act of justice.

Opposite: Týr et Fenrir

Týr (Norse mythology). Týr is the god of courage, honor, and war. He symbolizes war as an act of justice.

Asia, some war gods



Indra (Hinduism, India). King of the gods and god of war, storms, and the sky. Indra is also the defender of the heavens, the one who fights demons.

Indra (Hinduism, India). King of the gods and god of war, storms, and the sky. Indra is also the defender of the heavens, the one who fights demons.

Kartikeya (Hinduism, India). God of war and commander of the celestial armies. He also rules over victory, youth, and courage.

Kartikeya (Hinduism, India). God of war and commander of the celestial armies. He also rules over victory, youth, and courage.


Hachiman, dieu japonais de la guerre

Hachiman (Japan). Shinto god of war and protector of samurai warriors. The Japanese also considered him a protector god of their country.

Aresha (Zoroastrianism, Persia). God of victory and justice, he represents balance in conflict and triumph over chaos.

Chi You (Ancient China). An ancient war chief and god of war in Chinese folklore. He is also considered a legendary figure who led rebellions and epic battles.

Middle East, gods of war and destruction

Anat (Phoenicians). Goddess of war and fertility, she is a powerful and aggressive figure associated with destruction in battles.

Nergal (Mesopotamia). God of war and destruction, he is also linked to the underworld. A god of violence, epidemics, and chaos.

America, celestial figures

Huitzilopochtli (Aztecs, Mesoamerica). God of war, the sun, and patron of the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan. Huitzilopochtli is also associated with victory and human sacrifice to maintain cosmic order.

Tezcatlipoca (Aztecs). Though primarily a god of the night, he also plays a role in conflicts and conflict.

Opposite: Quetzalcoatl andTezcatlipoca

Mixcoatl (Aztecs). God of hunting and war, he is also linked to stars and celestial paths.

Mixcoatl (Aztecs). God of hunting and war, he is also linked to stars and celestial paths.

Viracocha (Incas, Andes). Creator god, but also a god of war for bringing order by conquering darkness.

Oceania – God of war

Ku (Hawaii). God of fighting, masculinity, and conquest. Ku is also worshiped for strength and victory, often through warrior rituals and sacrifices.

Tūmatauenga (Maori, New Zealand). God of human conflict. He is one of the principal gods in Maori mythology and represents the destructive aspect of humanity.


To conclude, these deities illustrate how cultures around the world have often personified war, each with its own characteristics, sometimes linked to violence, destruction, or wisdom, justice, and protection. They also give us insight into the place of war in each civilization.

Also read: Ares and Athena, gods of war.

Understanding Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach

In Strategy, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart develops the concept of the indirect approach. He provides a broad overview of military history from antiquity to World War II to demonstrate that the indirect approach yields far more decisive results at a significantly lower cost than the direct approach.

In Strategy, Sir Basil Henry Lidell Hart develops the notion of the indirect approach. He surveys military history from antiquity to the Second World War, to demonstrate that the indirect approach allows for much more decisive results at a significantly lower cost than the direct approach.

Avoiding Strength Against Strength

Liddell Hart contrasts the indirect approach, which he advocates, with the direct attack on the enemy’s army, for which he views Clausewitz as the main proponent. Indeed, in a strength-against-strength approach, even in the case of victory, it is likely that the winner will no longer be in a position to exploit their success.

One example he uses is the Battle of Malplaquet. In 1709, the French were on the ropes; the numerical superiority of the coalition (England, Austria, the Netherlands) was overwhelming. As a result, Marlborough and Prince Eugene opted for a direct approach, with the well-known outcome. Their losses were so severe that, despite their victory, they destroyed any hope of winning the war.

Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach : A Geographical Approach

According to Liddell Hart, a series of movements along the line of least expectation, threatening multiple objectives at once, should allow for surprising the enemy and striking them where they are weakest while keeping them uncertain, “on the horns of a dilemma” (Sherman). This method has proven far more decisive and economical throughout history than the direct attack on the enemy’s army.

For example, in 1864, Sherman’s raid did not target the Confederate army but the cities. He took care to always move in a direction that forced Confederate forces to defend multiple objectives. This movement proved decisive and hastened the defeat of the Confederacy.

The indirect approach for Liddell Hart is initially geographical, but it also has another dimension.

Deception and Psychology

The geographical dimension of the indirect approach, which brings surprise and indecision, is inseparable from its psychological dimension.

Liddell Hart recounts numerous instances of military deception in Strategy, such as Napoleon’s ruse at Arcole, where he sent his trumpeters behind enemy lines to signal a fake charge. The purpose of deception is to create a psychological effect, targeting the mind of the opposing commander. The indirect approach seeks to unbalance the enemy psychologically as much as physically.

Liddell Hart cites the example of Germany’s capitulation at the end of World War I. In 1918, the German armies were undoubtedly in a bad situation, but they were not yet defeated. Nevertheless, Germany surrendered. This can be explained by the fact that the Entente’s offensive in the Balkans shattered the German High Command’s confidence, leading them to believe—perhaps wrongly—that there was no way out of their situation.

Imbalance and Center of Gravity

The goal remains to unbalance the enemy, through actions on their forces, but also on the psychology of their leader.

Ultimately, the core of Liddell Hart’s analysis is the search for the enemy’s center of gravity, which is not necessarily their army. It can be material, such as their rear supply lines, or immaterial, like the mind of their commander.

It’s not about simply attacking the enemy where they are weakest, but rather identifying the point that, when pressured, will unbalance the enemy’s entire system with minimal effort. Liddell Hart is probably much closer to Clausewitz than he thinks…

Strategy and Grand Strategy

Liddell Hart’s analysis is limited to the use of military means within an armed conflict. This is because, for Liddell Hart, “strategy” is confined to warfare and is limited to the use of military forces. Only “grand strategy” looks beyond the horizon of war and considers the use of non-military means.

Finally, it’s worth noting that Liddell Hart’s reading of Clausewitz seems somewhat superficial. His thinking is reduced to a doctrine of frontal and reckless attacks on the enemy’s strongest point, whereas On War contains much more than that. However, discussing it here would take us too far…


See also Charles de Gaulle, General Culture As The True School Of Command.

Strategy according to General Beaufre’s “Introduction to Strategy”

In Introduction à la stratégie (Introduction to Strategy), French General André Beaufre presents the conclusions of his reflections on strategy in a dense, concise, and clear text.

André Beaufre, introduction to strategy

According to Beaufre, the meaning of the term “strategy” is often misunderstood. Historically, it was the science and art of supreme command, transmitted by example. However, with the evolution of warfare, this empirical transmission became obsolete, giving way to strategic research.

Nevertheless, this research remains inevitably influenced by the conflicts of its time. Only an abstract approach truly allows one to grasp the nature of strategy.

The Purpose of Strategy According to Beaufre

Before defining strategy, one must understand its purpose. Strategy does not unfold in a vacuum; it has a clear goal:

“The purpose of strategy is to achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Beaufre’s Definition of Strategy

Following the purpose, comes the definition. The famous definition of strategy appears early in Beaufre’s work. It is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.”

In war, each side seeks the opponent’s acceptance of the conditions it wishes to impose. Ultimately, it’s about convincing the other that continuing the fight is futile. Strategy thus targets the opponent’s will.

It is by placing a strategic problem within the psychological terrain of the adversary that one can properly assess the decisive factors. Therefore, the goal is to “reach a decision by creating and exploiting a situation that leads to a moral disintegration of the opponent, sufficient to make them accept the conditions one wants to impose.”

Thus, both sides aim simultaneously for the moral disintegration of the other. Strategic action is therefore dialectical: each side seeks to act while countering the actions of the other. Strategy becomes a struggle for freedom of action.

In the final analysis, according to Beaufre, strategy should be considered an art, as it requires the strategist to assess key elements based solely on their judgment. It is impossible to establish a set of rules that would apply in every circumstance.

The Means of Strategy According to Beaufre

Both belligerants choose their means by confronting the possibilities and vulnerabilities of the adversary. The question becomes: who do we want to defeat?

This leads to very concrete questions. For example: is capturing the enemy’s capital essential or not? Is the enemy particularly sensitive to human losses? The goal is to find the best way to achieve moral disintegration. From this confrontation of possibilities and the adversary’s vulnerabilities, a strategic objective emerges.

Strategic “Models”

General Beaufre identifies five strategic “models” based on means and objectives:

  1. Very powerful means for a modest objective: exerting a direct threat (nuclear deterrence).
  2. Modest objective, but insufficient means: limited freedom of action, requiring indirect pressure.
  3. Important objective, but limited means and freedom of action: successive limited actions, like Hitler between 1935 and 1939.
  4. Great freedom of action but weak means: prolonged total struggle of low military intensity, leading to the adversary’s moral exhaustion.
  5. Strong military means: military victory through the destruction of the enemy’s forces and occupation of its territory. However, the objective remains the opponent’s will. This model only works with a quick victory; otherwise, its cost becomes disproportionate to the stakes.

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For General André Beaufre, strategy is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.” It serves to “achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Strategic reasoning thus combines both material and psychological factors. It is a method of thinking that allows one to direct events rather than merely endure them.


Read also: When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

Understanding the moral dimension of the fight in Ardant du Picq in less than five minutes

In his Studies on Combat (1880, posthumous), Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq (1821 - 1870) proposed to start from the real soldier and combat, and not from theoretical conceptions to determine what it is possible to do in war. Indeed, things that are conceived in the mind or realized on the field of maneuver are not necessarily achievable in combat, because of the "primary instrument of war": man.

In Études sur le combat (Studies on Combat, 1880, posthumous), Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq (1821–1870) sets out to base his analysis on soldiers and combat. He takes them as they are in order to determine what is realistically achievable in war.

Indeed, what can be conceived in theory or practiced in maneuvers is not always feasible in combat. This is due to that “primary instrument of war”—the human being—and the supreme emotion in war: fear.

Ardant du Picq analyzes ancient wars, particularly the tactical formations of the Romans, before dissecting 19th-century combat.

Morale is the Key Dimension of Combat

For Ardant du Picq, morale is the key dimension of combat. Consequently, all attempts to approach war mathematically are futile.

He observes that in combat, gunfire is not very effective. Studies of the time showed that it took approximately 3,000 rounds to wound an enemy. This was due to the conditions of combat such as the smoke from weapons and, above all, fear. Soldiers would fire quickly and without aiming, creating the illusion of safety and helping to forget the danger. In many ways, this has not changed. He notes that the fire from skirmishers, who were less exposed because they were dispersed, was far more effective than that of battalions.

Physical fire has less impact on the enemy than movement. Movement brings the psychological threat of an impending clash, causing the weaker-minded to break. Ardant du Picq analyzes cavalry and infantry battles to show that hand-to-hand combat almost never occurs. He demonstrates that the unit with the weaker morale, often the one that must withstand the shock, will turn and flee at the mere prospect of physical contact with the enemy.

Discipline According to Ardant du Picq

Under these circumstances, how can soldiers be kept in combat? Only discipline makes this possible. In Studies on Combat, discipline can resemble mutual surveillance between soldiers or what we might call the social pressure of the unit. The author notes that punishments allowed at the time were no longer sufficient to keep troops in line, and a different motivator was needed.

Discipline, in fact, should not be understood as merely obeying orders without question, but as what enables soldiers to stay with and for their comrades in situations where instinct tells them to flee.

Ultimately, military organizations and command systems are, above all, mechanisms for managing fear.

“The combatant is flesh and bone, body and soul, and no matter how strong the soul, it cannot so dominate the body that there is no revolt of the flesh and disturbance of the mind in the face of destruction.”
— Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq,

Read also :

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

In Stratégie théorique II (Theoretical Strategy II), General Poirier describes a form of conflict that extends beyond the traditional concept of war under the pressure of nuclear weapons. This state between war and peace is reminiscent of what we now call “hybrid warfare”. Which, by the way, has always existed—but that’s another debate…

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

Competitive Commerce

He introduces the concept of “Integral Strategy” into the theoretical field. In order to achieve their political goals while countering those of their adversaries, sociopolitical actors combine military, economic, and cultural strategies.

The state of conflictual tension without resorting to physical violence, which arises from the clash of different actors’ political goals, is called “competitive commerce.” However, with the advent of nuclear weapons, this state of tension evolves into what the general calls “generalized aggressiveness.”

Also read: Understanding Why, For de Gaulle, General Knowledge Is the True School of Command

Hybrid Warfare or Crisis Maneuver ?

Indeed, due to the prospect of a nuclear confrontation, the realization of a state’s political project is largely deprived of the military dimension of their integral strategy. This results in increased activity and aggressiveness in economic and cultural strategies, but with the obligation to remain “below the critical threshold of open conflict”. This blurs the distinction between peace and war in a “crisis maneuver.”

In this context, military strategy must use “sub-war forms.” Previously, war encompassed military strategy; now, it is merely one of its modalities.

Finally, let’s read the general’s description of this type of conflict. While expressing the reality of the Cold War, he almost exactly describe hybrid warfare:

“Localized and sporadic interventions, with varying degrees of controlled violence (unrest, attacks, sabotage, coups, piracy, terrorism, subversion, etc.) support ideological propaganda and economic pressures that become challenges, with bargaining that no longer hides the fact that it is blackmail.”

—Lucien Poirier, Stratégie théorique II

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See also: Lucien Poirier’s Comprehensive Strategy


Try one of our Clausewitz articles. War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means. Or Clausewitz’s Friction.

The crisis of authority

“ Our youth love luxury, have bad manners, mock authority, and show no respect for the elderly. In our time, children are tyrants. ”
— Socrates

This brief reflection on the past shows us that the crisis of authority remains a highly subjective phenomenon. It must be studied in light of its contemporary manifestations.

In Qu’est-ce qu’un chef ? (What Is a Leader?), General de Villiers highlights the paradox of a crisis of authority accompanied by a strong demand for leadership.

The crisis of authority

How does this crisis of authority manifest, and how should we respond?

Authority should ultimately benefit those upon whom it is exercised. Without this, it will remain in perpetual crisis.

Authority: according to Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), authority is a form of power that requires neither persuasion nor coercion. Etymologically, it stems from “to augment.” Yet, it remains a form of domination.

The Crisis of Institutions Representing Authority

All the institutions that have traditionally represented authority no longer wield the power they once did.

The Church no longer exercises real authority over the behavior of the masses as it did before the late 19th century. Papal decrees no longer hold political influence.

Schools are a prime battleground for the contemporary crisis of authority. Some teachers struggle to maintain classroom discipline, and some even refuse to assert their authority. For instance, in 2018, a student in Créteil threatened his teacher with a weapon. Arendt noted that if authority is in crisis in education, it’s because “adults refuse to assume responsibility for the world into which they have placed children.” Moreover, the school’s failure to mitigate social inequalities has diminished its legitimacy.

This crisis is highly visible because it coincides with a crisis of power (distinct from authority) over physical bodies. Exercising control over bodies outside the economic realm is increasingly difficult. For example, the Universal National Service is controversial because it’s intended to be mandatory. Furthermore, discipline in schools is hard to enforce. The end of military service has removed the routine political control over bodies.

On closer analysis, however, this crisis of authority reveals itself as a crisis of legitimacy.

Crisis of Authority or Crisis of Legitimacy?

The crisis of authority is, in fact, a crisis of legitimacy.

Authority is grounded in legitimacy. In Economy and Society, Max Weber distinguishes three forms of legitimacy for authority:

  • Traditional authority, based on sacred respect for customs and those who hold power by tradition;
  • Legal-rational authority, grounded in the validity of laws established through legislative or bureaucratic means;
  • Charismatic authority, which relies on the devotion of followers to a leader with exceptional qualities.

In reality, these three forms of legitimacy are often intertwined.

Traditional authority has largely evaporated. Arendt noted that authority disappeared from the modern world due to the rise of totalitarian regimes in the 20th century, which challenged all forms of traditional authority.

Legal-rational authority is insufficient. In Le fil de l’épée (The Edge of the Sword), de Gaulle noted that rank alone is not enough to command obedience; it must be coupled with charisma. Today, as Christophe Guilluy points out in French Fractures, the political sphere has been discredited in favor of consensual or technical solutions, which are ill-suited to challenge economic domination.

Knowledge as a source of authority is now questioned, due to its easy accessibility through ICT. Michel Serres addresses this in Thumbelina, noting that knowledge is no longer the sole prerogative of teachers or doctors. Thus, the sources of authority in schools need to be redefined with new value added by teachers.

Authority is indeed in crisis, but our societies can address it.


Read also Manufacturing Consent: The Press and Media According to Noam Chomsky.


How to Address the Crisis of Authority

While the crisis of authority is real, its consequences can be managed by placing humanity at the center of authority.

This involves aligning authority with human measures. According to General de Villiers in Qu’est ce qu’un chef ? (What Is a Leader?), at the heart of the crisis of authority is its dehumanization. We might question the role of leaders in the corporate sphere, their exemplarity, and their willingness to engage with subordinates. Indeed, their task is to maximize profitability, their workforce is easily replaceable, and they themselves are embedded in systems of domination and exploitation.

What Is Authority?

Authority is about uplifting others. Etymologically, “authority” comes from “to augment.” This is the condition sine qua non for the acceptance of authority: it must benefit the one who submits to it, as they do so voluntarily. The benefit is not material, like a salary, which would remain in the realm of power since individuals are compelled to earn a living. It is moral: belonging to a prestigious group, enhancing skills or personal qualities that one values. This explains the need for leadership noted by General de Villiers.

What About the Military?

The military experience serves as a laboratory for contemporary forms of authority. Uniquely, it trains leaders in the exercise of authority. It’s based on exemplarity and a leader’s ability to ensure the continuity of their unit (recruitment, rest, training). Leaders who deplete their unit without renewing its strength, who consume more than they build, see their authority diminish and are forced to rely on power. Moreover, the military operates in a realm insulated from profitability. Leaders serve their superiors by fulfilling missions and serve their subordinates by preparing them for engagement. They are not seeking to exploit them (in the Marxist sense). Finally, they are statutorily responsible for defending their subordinates’ interests.


By refocusing leadership on human needs, we can restore balance to the structures necessary for our society. This requires distancing ourselves from the neoliberal dogma, which culminates in a society of entirely “free” individuals, placed in competition and recognizing only the law of the market as legitimate.

However, the crisis of authority also reveals a deeper crisis of power that could fracture the cohesion of French society.

Additional Reflection

Notably, this “crisis of authority” actually benefits the dominant class.

There is no crisis of authority in prestigious Parisian high schools or elite universities. These institutions serve as legitimizing tools for the elite’s continued dominance through academic credentials (Bourdieu). There is also no crisis of authority in corporations generally, which maintain power dynamics. A disgruntled employee challenging the authority of their leader would quickly be shown the door.

It’s primarily the dominated classes who challenge authority, and only in the public sphere (the State, police, schools)—to their own detriment (hindering social mobility due to ignorance of the real rules of the game). This may be because authority and the State, as the visible face of power, are unconsciously, yet rightly, perceived as instruments of social domination. Economic domination, however, remains invisible and is even viewed as legitimate and natural.

The State and public authority may indeed serve as instruments of domination for the benefit of the ruling class. However, in France at least, they also act as bulwarks for the working class against economic power. The crisis of authority may thus stem from a self-destructive reaction to a vague sense of injustice. In this sense, we could say the crisis of authority benefits the dominant class. Perhaps, given its persistence over time, it serves the structural function of perpetuating the subordinate position of the dominated class, since the model being challenged remains the only one offering freedom, social justice, and security.

Could the real cause of the crisis of authority be class struggle?
Could the real cause of the crisis of authority be class struggle?

Manufacturing Consent: The Press and Media According to Noam Chomsky

Understanding the Structural Submission of the Media to Dominant Power According to Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent

According to Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent, the Western mainstream media defends the power in place in a structural way.

According to Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent, mainstream Western media structurally defend the interests of the ruling power.

In Manufacturing Consent (1988), Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman identify five filters through which Western media align with the interests of dominant power. This means that the latter doesn’t need to resort to censorship.


Discover Ares and Athena, Gods of War.

Size, Ownership, and Profit Orientation

First, it’s important to remember that major media outlets are huge corporations run by billionaires or CEOs, who are themselves closely controlled by purely profit-driven interest groups. These companies, therefore, share common interests with other corporations, banks, and the government.

Advertising

The economic model of mainstream media relies on advertising. This dependency leads to an alignment with advertisers’ interests and a reduction in content quality.

Source Selection

Powerful institutions maintain a continuous flow of information to the media. These “official” sources (government, industrial groups, experts) are cheaper than sending a reporter into the field. Moreover, their information is readily accepted and requires no verification. Today, we can cite the media’s obsession with the Twitter accounts of political leaders, a convenient and free source.

Flak. Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent.

Any dissenting opinion faces a barrage of criticism from institutional actors, such as think tanks (often conservative), the government, or other media outlets.

Ideology

Lastly, information that aligns with the dominant ideology (at the time of Manufacturing Consent, anti-communism) is less likely to be scrutinized than information that challenges it.

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    To summarize, according to Manufacturing Consent, mainstream media’s defense of ruling power interests is structural, almost invisible, and therefore much more effective than censorship.


    Read also Progressive Neoliberalism According to Nancy Fraser.

    Another topic : Charles de Gaulle, General Culture As The True School Of Command.

    India: A Deceptive Power

    Will India have the capacity to impose itself as a great power on the international scene?
India Great Power, Arms and toga.

    New Delhi has nuclear weapons but is unable to electrify its entire territory. Under these circumstances, will India be able to establish itself as a great power on the international stage?

    Over the next ten years, India is likely to be confined to a regional power role because it is a paper tiger and due to its relations with its neighbors.


    The Assets of an Emerging Great Power

    India possesses several assets that suggest it could become a great power in the short term.

    Nuclear Power. New Delhi acquired nuclear weapons in 1998. It is believed to have around 100 nuclear warheads, bombers, and a nuclear-powered submarine (with a second one under construction).

    Stable Political Regime. India is known as the “world’s largest democracy.” It manages to have 900 million voters in a stable system since 1947. However, the ruling party of Narendra Modi exploits religious divisions, which can sometimes lead to violence.

    Desire for Power. India has a genuine desire for power. It has a prestigious past and sees itself as a great power. For instance, it attempted to send a probe to the Moon in July 2019.

    However, India’s desire for power faces structural obstacles.


    Limitations to India’s Power

    Certain successes should not obscure the real limitations to India’s ambition for power.

    An Illusory Economy

    Although India shows a growth rate of 7%, higher than China’s, and has risen to the 6th largest economy globally, just ahead of France, it still faces deep challenges. The country struggles to feed its population. One in two children suffers from malnutrition. India needs to integrate 12 million new entrants into the labor market each year, requiring an 8% growth rate. Inequalities are increasing, and 20% of the population lives on less than $2 a day. Furthermore, South Asian economies are poorly integrated regionally: India’s trade with its neighbors accounts for only 2%.

    Population and Territory Issues

    While the population size (1.3 billion and growing) and territory size are power factors, India struggles to harness this space. Not the entire country is electrified. Additionally, while the population is large, the education system is inadequate, especially in rural areas: some schools lack teachers, and 25% of the population is illiterate. The state of public health is unsatisfactory, with the country spending only 1% of its GDP on health (compared to 11% for France). Some power factors thus become limitations to Indian power.

    An Ineffective Military

    Although India has nuclear weapons, its armed forces and military-industrial complex are actually underperforming. The Indian army has 1.2 million personnel, but its equipment is outdated. It is undergoing modernization, but its industrial and technological defense base cannot supply the needed equipment. As a result, India is the world’s largest arms importer, acquiring Scorpene submarines and Rafale jets.

    Limited Soft Power

    While India is known for its cuisine, yoga, and especially Bollywood, its diplomatic weight is overall insufficient. Some of its 160 embassies lack ambassadors. Moreover, it lacks a network of cultural centers like the Confucius Institutes or the Alliance Française.

    These internal limitations are exacerbated by a contested regional environment.


    Read also Is Iran a Democracy?

    A Contested Regional Environment that Could Limit India’s Power

    Competition in India’s regional environment influences its internal situation and is likely to limit its power expansion in the medium term.

    Border Conflicts. India’s borders remain geopolitical issues. China claims Arunachal Pradesh in the Himalayas, and Pakistan claims Kashmir. India has fought several border wars: in 1962 against China, which annexed Aksai Chin; against Pakistan in 1948 (status quo maintained), 1965, and 1971 (India’s victories). Skirmishes occurred in Kargil in 1999, with the latest clashes in 2019. The accession of both countries to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017 does not seem to have changed the situation.

    These border conflicts fuel internal tensions. Kashmir, historically a tension point between Pakistan and India, sees a strong Indian military presence. Riots regularly erupt to protest against troop behavior. Pro-independence movements and jihadist groups have committed attacks (2001 against the Indian parliament, 2019 by Jaish e Mohammed against an Indian barracks). Pakistan supports some terrorist movements to defend its claims and tie down 600,000 Indian soldiers. This region, which requested attachment to India under pressure from Pakistani incursions in 1947, is strategic as it controls the Indus River, crucial for water supply to both India and Pakistan.

    Competition with China. The competition between China and India seems to favor China. India’s Look East Policy, with a regional scope, is confronted by the globally oriented Belt and Road Initiative. China’s navy is superior to India’s. Economic competition also heavily favors China: India exports iron to China and imports manufactured goods, reflecting the relationship between a developing country and a developed neighbor. Finally, China firmly opposes India’s access to the UN Security Council.

    *

    India’s aspirations for power may thus be hindered by its economic development limits and especially by a contested regional environment that weighs on its power policy.

    However, the American reaction to the rise of Chinese power could provide India an opportunity to position itself as an important intermediary.


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    Understanding Absolute War and Real War in Clausewitz in Five Minutes

    Absolute war, the realm of the rise to extremes, therefore only exists in theory. In real war, several principles of moderation prevent this rise to extremes.

    In Books I and VIII of On War, Clausewitz develops the concept of rise to extremes, as well as those of “absolute” and “real” war.

    Absolute war, theoretical war

    From the start of Book I, Clausewitz offers a definition of war. It is “an act of force by which we seek to force the adversary to submit to our will”. From there, incapacitating oneself from the enemy becomes an intermediate goal. This is the condition for bending it to our will.

    In a purely logical approach, Clausewitz shows that in theory this “act of force” which is war can only go to extremes. It is absolute war (for war taken in the absolute, in its principle).

    Three “reciprocal actions” allow the rise to extremes according to Clausewitz.

    – Unlimited reciprocal use of force. He who makes the most complete use of it has an advantage over his enemy. The latter is then forced to do the same.

    – The search for the overthrow of the adversary. Each of the two camps tries to submit the other to its will. He will therefore try to reduce his enemy to impotence. Neither of them is therefore safe until the other is unable to defend themselves.

    – Calculation of the necessary efforts and escalation. Each of the two opponents calculates the efforts that will be necessary to surpass the other. This can only lead to a perpetual gradation leading to extremes.

    The rise to extremes is therefore an unlimited use of force. Because of these three “reciprocal actions”, in the world of ideas, the natural movement of war leads to the rise to extremes.

    Actual war

    However, the theoretical principle of rising to extremes does not apply in actual warfare . Indeed, in real war there are brakes on this rise to extremes.

    Real war cannot go to extremes

    The belligerents are not abstract entities emerging from nothing for instant confrontation. They know each other, and are able to estimate the will of their opponent. This introduces a first principle of moderation .

    Furthermore, war has a duration. An error in estimating the enemy’s will can therefore be repaired. This introduces a second possibility of reciprocal moderation. And even in case of defeat, the result is never final.

    There are other obstacles to achieving absolute war. This is the case with human weaknesses such as indecision or imperfection of judgment; or else friction in the conduct of war by state apparatuses. Finally, low stakes can discourage rise to extremes.

    Real war has limits

    The limits of the use of force in real war will therefore not be positioned at the extremes. They will be determined by calculation, reasoning and probabilities.

    These terminals will be placed according to the political goal. It will require more or less significant efforts for one, and will provoke a greater or lesser will to fight in the other.

    It is this political goal which will determine the result that military action must achieve.

    Absolute war , the realm of the rise to extremes, therefore only exists in theory. In real war, several principles of moderation prevent this rise to extremes. While Clausewitz recognizes that trying to avoid bloodshed in war would go against the essence of war, he does not recommend introducing rise to the extremes of violence into actual warThe rise to extremes is only a theoretical object which is intended to remain so.

    However, and this is the usefulness of the theory, this concept must be kept in mind as the natural direction of all war.


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    The principle of moderation in war

    This leads us to analyze a quote from the master that is often repeated, but often misunderstood:

    “it will always be an absurdity to want to introduce a principle of moderation into war.”

    On War , p. 28

    Taken in this way, it would be the profession of faith of a Clausewitz apostle of the rise to extremes, who would advocate maximum use of force without taking into account the laws and customs of war or the political context. The indiscriminate unleashing of violence would be the only way to win.

    Nothing could be more false, nothing more criminal against the thought of the master. Let’s put the quote in context:

    “If the wars of civilized peoples are much less cruel and devastating than those of unsophisticated peoples, this is due to the social state of the former and their international relations. War is influenced by this state and these relationships which modify and temper it, but these elements remain foreign to it, a simple external fact , so that it will always be an absurdity to want to introduce a principle of moderation into war.”

    On War, p. 28. Emphasis added.

    If war taken in theory has no moderating principle and naturally rises to extremes, real war is in fact moderate. However, the moderating element comes not from the nature of war itself, but from its environment. He nonetheless has a very real influence. The maxim which closes our quotation therefore only applies to absolute war. It is anything but a negation of moderation in the reality of war.

    This brings us closer to one of the major themes of On War , which is that war should not be considered as an autonomous phenomenon, but as a political phenomenon subject to political decisions. But addressing it here would take us beyond five minutes…

    *

    Thus, if he places violence at the heart of war, both absolute and real, Clausewitz in no way recommends giving free rein to unbridled violence to achieve victory. The rise to extremes is a theoretical object which is not intended to be embodied in real war. The latter is indeed marked by several limitations external to its nature.

    “We are thus led to consider war not as it should be according to its concept, but as it is in reality, that is to say with all the foreign elements which are introduced into it and modify it »

    Carl Von Clausewitz, On War , Book VIII

    EDITOR’S NOTE:

    Some authors consider that absolute war could occur in reality, as in the case of nuclear war. In book VIII, Clausewitz himself indicates that the Napoleonic wars brought absolute war to earth.

    However, it seems to us that even in the event of an outbreak of extreme violence, a certain number of obstacles would remain. For example, due to the friction that would arise in the units responsible for annihilating opposing cities, such as disagreements, equipment malfunction, hesitation or even refusal to obey. The fact that a war can take an apocalyptic form does not mean that it would be without brakes.

    The hypothesis according to which absolute war is an ideal (in the theoretical sense of a pure and perfect form of war) which would serve as a compass to understand the direction taken by real war seems to us the richest. Quite simply, without this the concept of absolute war would not be of much interest.

    *

    See our other articles on Clausewitz.

    War as a continuation of politics by other means

    The astonishing trinity in Clausewitz, and why the master describes war as a chameleon

    Friction in Clausewitz

    The center of gravity in Clausewitz

    Is France a maritime power?

    France has the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. However, its fishing fleet is declining and its navy is regularly falling in the ranking of world navies. Does France have a real ambition for maritime power?

    Despite the size of its EEZ, France does not seem to have the desire to be a maritime power.

    Despite the size of its EEZ, France does not seem to have the desire to be a maritime power.

    Is France a maritime power? The mirage of space

    The French EEZ is little developed, but not very valuable.

    Strong potential

     The French EEZ (200 miles around the French coast) is 11 million km 2. Polynesia alone has an EEZ of 4 million km2 . It is the 2nd largest in the world after that of the United States. Its maritime domain, even more extensive, is the 1st in the world. However, this area is not very coherent since it extends over the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans.

    NB the maritime domain of a country extends over an area of ​​350 miles around its coasts. Unlike the EEZ, the maritime domain does not include the water column, but only the soil and subsoil.

    The sea: a primary, but also industrial, sector with high added value 

    The French maritime economy represents 300,000 direct jobs (for reference, the automobile sector represents 220,000). Naval Group and the Atlantic shipyards (3,000 employees) have strong technological and industrial know-how . In these times of deindustrialization , the maritime economy is therefore a key sector.

    Few resources

    However, this EEZ and this maritime domain contain few resources apart from fisheries resources. They contain little or no hydrocarbons: research in Guyana has been abandoned . Only scattered islands could contain oil. If it is likely that rare earths are found in the subsoil of the French maritime domain, their research and exploitation would represent a technical and financial challenge.

    A fishing fleet in difficulty

    The EEZ therefore only contains fishery resources. However, the French fishing fleet is in difficulty. Its boats are few and diminishing. Brittany was home to 3,000 fishing vessels in 1995, compared to 1,300 today. The boats are small, 80% are less than 12 m. They are also old, with an average age of 27 years. Maintenance is therefore expensive and profitability declines . The situation is even more difficult overseas. The entire Polynesian EEZ only allows the capture of 13,600 tonnes of fish per year, while the Fiji Islands alone catch 44,000 tonnes per year. In addition, this fishing is essentially coastal, it overexploits the coasts to the detriment of the open sea.

    The size of its EEZ also creates difficulties in asserting France’s sovereignty.


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    A sovereignty difficult to assert

    While the French maritime space could be a source of power, the difficulties of the French Navy in controlling it make it a reason for fragility.

    Is France a maritime power? A national navy in decline

    The French Navy has 120 ships of more than 100 tonnes . It ranks 7th in  the world of navies , but the general trend is towards the development of naval forces everywhere in the world, except in Europe and the United States. It could therefore see itself caught up in the coming years, particularly by South Korea. In reality, the French navy lacks resources in relation to the area it has to control. For example, it only deploys 2 surveillance frigates per ocean . The United States Navy is 10 times larger in tonnage, while the two EEZs are approximately the same size.

    However, the national navy has assets which rank it among the leading navies in the world despite its tonnage . Its ability to fight and resupply on the high seas, to project forces or its carrier group represent rare capabilities, the result of significant investments.

    The distances cause difficulties in asserting France’s sovereignty over its maritime zone

    Thus, the Clipperton Atoll, off the coast of Mexico, is only visited once a year by a vessel of the French Navy. The atoll is uninhabited, but has an airstrip, regularly used by drug traffickers with complete impunity.

    France therefore sees its sovereignty called into question in places

    Thus, the scattered islands are claimed by Madagascar, which is supported by the UN general assembly. However, the EEZ of these islands could contain oil, and in any case they make it possible to control the Mozambique Channel. As a result, they are almost all inhabited by a gendarme and military detachments are stationed there. These are the forces of sovereignty.

    All this does not prevent certain successes in the fight against drug trafficking in the Antilles or against piracy . Thus, thanks to the European operation Atalanta, piracy off the coast of Somalia has almost disappeared.

    The source of these difficulties is that France does not really have the desire to be a maritime power.


    A lack of will

    It is due to a lack of political will that the maritime space is transformed into a weakness instead of being a power multiplier.

    No port strategy

    Le Havre, the leading  French container port, is only 56th in  the world. In fact, one container in two destined for France does not pass through French ports. However, the 2018 national port strategy is limited to the merger of the ports of Paris, Le Havre and Rouen, and the rapprochement of Mediterranean ports. Édouard Philippe even declared in substance in 2018 that there was no real port strategy in France. The success of CMA-CGM, the 3rd maritime  transport company in the world, should not overshadow the reality of the absence of a national strategy.

    Weak investment in Marine Renewable Energy (MRE) 

    The vast French EEZ could be used for the development of MREs. However, there is little productive infrastructure, such as a few tidal farms or the Rance tidal power plant (which has a power of 57 MWatts, compared to 1 GW for a nuclear power plant). The rest is in the experimental stage. The State finances research through aid, to the tune of 3 million euros per year. MRE are the poor relation of renewable energies, which give priority to solar and wind power. The French ambition is to have a production of 100 MW in 2023. For comparison, Scotland already produces a power of 1 GW thanks to EMR.

    A global disinterest 

    The sea is not a priority for France. Its issues were not the subject of any major speech by the president . The priority given to the construction of the new aircraft carrier, understandable in view of nuclear deterrence , shows that France sees above all in the sea an environment allowing the projection of power and the protection of its territory through deterrence . Effective control of its maritime space will remain problematic despite the planned entry into service of Oceanic Patrollers and Overseas Patrollers. Certainly, France has embarked on freedom of navigation operations (this involves navigating in contested waters) to assert its global role, but this is not enough to make it a maritime power. 

    This French distance from the sea has its roots in the long term . For a long time, the question of maritime power was posed in opposition to continental security. Unable to make an effort everywhere, France resolved its dilemma at the expense of the sea. Despite some successes, its navy was never able to compete with the Royal Navy .

    *

    France therefore does not give itself the means to be a great maritime power. France’s relative disinterest in the sea can be understood by the historical tension between the country’s security, which has long required giving priority to land forces, and its power, which is expressed on the seas.

    The shift of the world towards Asia and the period of peace experienced by the European Union could change this paradigm, unless regular tensions in the East bring this French dilemma back into focus.

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