Understanding Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach

Posted on 5 September 2024 by Les armes et la toge

In Strategy, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart develops the concept of the indirect approach. He provides a broad overview of military history from antiquity to World War II to demonstrate that the indirect approach yields far more decisive results at a significantly lower cost than the direct approach.

In Strategy, Sir Basil Henry Lidell Hart develops the notion of the indirect approach. He surveys military history from antiquity to the Second World War, to demonstrate that the indirect approach allows for much more decisive results at a significantly lower cost than the direct approach.

Avoiding Strength Against Strength

Liddell Hart contrasts the indirect approach, which he advocates, with the direct attack on the enemy’s army, for which he views Clausewitz as the main proponent. Indeed, in a strength-against-strength approach, even in the case of victory, it is likely that the winner will no longer be in a position to exploit their success.

One example he uses is the Battle of Malplaquet. In 1709, the French were on the ropes; the numerical superiority of the coalition (England, Austria, the Netherlands) was overwhelming. As a result, Marlborough and Prince Eugene opted for a direct approach, with the well-known outcome. Their losses were so severe that, despite their victory, they destroyed any hope of winning the war.

Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach : A Geographical Approach

According to Liddell Hart, a series of movements along the line of least expectation, threatening multiple objectives at once, should allow for surprising the enemy and striking them where they are weakest while keeping them uncertain, “on the horns of a dilemma” (Sherman). This method has proven far more decisive and economical throughout history than the direct attack on the enemy’s army.

For example, in 1864, Sherman’s raid did not target the Confederate army but the cities. He took care to always move in a direction that forced Confederate forces to defend multiple objectives. This movement proved decisive and hastened the defeat of the Confederacy.

The indirect approach for Liddell Hart is initially geographical, but it also has another dimension.

Deception and Psychology

The geographical dimension of the indirect approach, which brings surprise and indecision, is inseparable from its psychological dimension.

Liddell Hart recounts numerous instances of military deception in Strategy, such as Napoleon’s ruse at Arcole, where he sent his trumpeters behind enemy lines to signal a fake charge. The purpose of deception is to create a psychological effect, targeting the mind of the opposing commander. The indirect approach seeks to unbalance the enemy psychologically as much as physically.

Liddell Hart cites the example of Germany’s capitulation at the end of World War I. In 1918, the German armies were undoubtedly in a bad situation, but they were not yet defeated. Nevertheless, Germany surrendered. This can be explained by the fact that the Entente’s offensive in the Balkans shattered the German High Command’s confidence, leading them to believe—perhaps wrongly—that there was no way out of their situation.

Imbalance and Center of Gravity

The goal remains to unbalance the enemy, through actions on their forces, but also on the psychology of their leader.

Ultimately, the core of Liddell Hart’s analysis is the search for the enemy’s center of gravity, which is not necessarily their army. It can be material, such as their rear supply lines, or immaterial, like the mind of their commander.

It’s not about simply attacking the enemy where they are weakest, but rather identifying the point that, when pressured, will unbalance the enemy’s entire system with minimal effort. Liddell Hart is probably much closer to Clausewitz than he thinks…

Strategy and Grand Strategy

Liddell Hart’s analysis is limited to the use of military means within an armed conflict. This is because, for Liddell Hart, “strategy” is confined to warfare and is limited to the use of military forces. Only “grand strategy” looks beyond the horizon of war and considers the use of non-military means.

Finally, it’s worth noting that Liddell Hart’s reading of Clausewitz seems somewhat superficial. His thinking is reduced to a doctrine of frontal and reckless attacks on the enemy’s strongest point, whereas On War contains much more than that. However, discussing it here would take us too far…

Strategy according to General Beaufre’s “Introduction to Strategy”

Posted on 2 September 2024 by Nicolas Blanchard-Farce

In Introduction à la stratégie (Introduction to Strategy), French General André Beaufre presents the conclusions of his reflections on strategy in a dense, concise, and clear text.

According to Beaufre, the meaning of the term “strategy” is often misunderstood. Historically, it was the science and art of supreme command, transmitted by example. However, with the evolution of warfare, this empirical transmission became obsolete, giving way to strategic research.

Nevertheless, this research remains inevitably influenced by the conflicts of its time. Only an abstract approach truly allows one to grasp the nature of strategy.

The Purpose of Strategy According to Beaufre

Before defining strategy, one must understand its purpose. Strategy does not unfold in a vacuum; it has a clear goal:

“The purpose of strategy is to achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Beaufre’s Definition of Strategy

Following the purpose, comes the definition. The famous definition of strategy appears early in Beaufre’s work. It is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.”

In war, each side seeks the opponent’s acceptance of the conditions it wishes to impose. Ultimately, it’s about convincing the other that continuing the fight is futile. Strategy thus targets the opponent’s will.

It is by placing a strategic problem within the psychological terrain of the adversary that one can properly assess the decisive factors. Therefore, the goal is to “reach a decision by creating and exploiting a situation that leads to a moral disintegration of the opponent, sufficient to make them accept the conditions one wants to impose.”

Thus, both sides aim simultaneously for the moral disintegration of the other. Strategic action is therefore dialectical: each side seeks to act while countering the actions of the other. Strategy becomes a struggle for freedom of action.

In the final analysis, according to Beaufre, strategy should be considered an art, as it requires the strategist to assess key elements based solely on their judgment. It is impossible to establish a set of rules that would apply in every circumstance.

The Means of Strategy According to Beaufre

Both belligerants choose their means by confronting the possibilities and vulnerabilities of the adversary. The question becomes: who do we want to defeat?

This leads to very concrete questions. For example: is capturing the enemy’s capital essential or not? Is the enemy particularly sensitive to human losses? The goal is to find the best way to achieve moral disintegration. From this confrontation of possibilities and the adversary’s vulnerabilities, a strategic objective emerges.

Strategic “Models”

General Beaufre identifies five strategic “models” based on means and objectives:

Very powerful means for a modest objective: exerting a direct threat (nuclear deterrence).
Modest objective, but insufficient means: limited freedom of action, requiring indirect pressure.
Important objective, but limited means and freedom of action: successive limited actions, like Hitler between 1935 and 1939.
Great freedom of action but weak means: prolonged total struggle of low military intensity, leading to the adversary’s moral exhaustion.
Strong military means: military victory through the destruction of the enemy’s forces and occupation of its territory. However, the objective remains the opponent’s will. This model only works with a quick victory; otherwise, its cost becomes disproportionate to the stakes.

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For General André Beaufre, strategy is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.” It serves to “achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Strategic reasoning thus combines both material and psychological factors. It is a method of thinking that allows one to direct events rather than merely endure them.

Understanding the moral dimension of the fight in Ardant du Picq in less than five minutes

Posted on 26 August 2024 by Les armes et la toge

In his Studies on Combat (1880, posthumous), Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq (1821 - 1870) proposed to start from the real soldier and combat, and not from theoretical conceptions to determine what it is possible to do in war. Indeed, things that are conceived in the mind or realized on the field of maneuver are not necessarily achievable in combat, because of the "primary instrument of war": man.

In Études sur le combat (Studies on Combat, 1880, posthumous), Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq (1821–1870) sets out to base his analysis on soldiers and combat. He takes them as they are in order to determine what is realistically achievable in war.

Indeed, what can be conceived in theory or practiced in maneuvers is not always feasible in combat. This is due to that “primary instrument of war”—the human being—and the supreme emotion in war: fear.

Ardant du Picq analyzes ancient wars, particularly the tactical formations of the Romans, before dissecting 19th-century combat.

Morale is the Key Dimension of Combat

For Ardant du Picq, morale is the key dimension of combat. Consequently, all attempts to approach war mathematically are futile.

He observes that in combat, gunfire is not very effective. Studies of the time showed that it took approximately 3,000 rounds to wound an enemy. This was due to the conditions of combat such as the smoke from weapons and, above all, fear. Soldiers would fire quickly and without aiming, creating the illusion of safety and helping to forget the danger. In many ways, this has not changed. He notes that the fire from skirmishers, who were less exposed because they were dispersed, was far more effective than that of battalions.

Physical fire has less impact on the enemy than movement. Movement brings the psychological threat of an impending clash, causing the weaker-minded to break. Ardant du Picq analyzes cavalry and infantry battles to show that hand-to-hand combat almost never occurs. He demonstrates that the unit with the weaker morale, often the one that must withstand the shock, will turn and flee at the mere prospect of physical contact with the enemy.

Discipline According to Ardant du Picq

Under these circumstances, how can soldiers be kept in combat? Only discipline makes this possible. In Studies on Combat, discipline can resemble mutual surveillance between soldiers or what we might call the social pressure of the unit. The author notes that punishments allowed at the time were no longer sufficient to keep troops in line, and a different motivator was needed.

Discipline, in fact, should not be understood as merely obeying orders without question, but as what enables soldiers to stay with and for their comrades in situations where instinct tells them to flee.

Ultimately, military organizations and command systems are, above all, mechanisms for managing fear.

“The combatant is flesh and bone, body and soul, and no matter how strong the soul, it cannot so dominate the body that there is no revolt of the flesh and disturbance of the mind in the face of destruction.”
— Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq,

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

Posted on 24 August 2024 by Nicolas Blanchard-Farce

In Stratégie théorique II (Theoretical Strategy II), General Poirier describes a form of conflict that extends beyond the traditional concept of war under the pressure of nuclear weapons. This state between war and peace is reminiscent of what we now call “hybrid warfare”. Which, by the way, has always existed—but that’s another debate…

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

Competitive Commerce

He introduces the concept of “Integral Strategy” into the theoretical field. In order to achieve their political goals while countering those of their adversaries, sociopolitical actors combine military, economic, and cultural strategies.

The state of conflictual tension without resorting to physical violence, which arises from the clash of different actors’ political goals, is called “competitive commerce.” However, with the advent of nuclear weapons, this state of tension evolves into what the general calls “generalized aggressiveness.”

Also read: Understanding Why, For de Gaulle, General Knowledge Is the True School of Command

Hybrid Warfare or Crisis Maneuver ?

Indeed, due to the prospect of a nuclear confrontation, the realization of a state’s political project is largely deprived of the military dimension of their integral strategy. This results in increased activity and aggressiveness in economic and cultural strategies, but with the obligation to remain “below the critical threshold of open conflict”. This blurs the distinction between peace and war in a “crisis maneuver.”

In this context, military strategy must use “sub-war forms.” Previously, war encompassed military strategy; now, it is merely one of its modalities.

Finally, let’s read the general’s description of this type of conflict. While expressing the reality of the Cold War, he almost exactly describe hybrid warfare:

“Localized and sporadic interventions, with varying degrees of controlled violence (unrest, attacks, sabotage, coups, piracy, terrorism, subversion, etc.) support ideological propaganda and economic pressures that become challenges, with bargaining that no longer hides the fact that it is blackmail.”

—Lucien Poirier, Stratégie théorique II

Try one of our Clausewitz articles. War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means. Or Clausewitz’s Friction.

The crisis of authority

Posted on 23 August 2024 by Les armes et la toge

“ Our youth love luxury, have bad manners, mock authority, and show no respect for the elderly. In our time, children are tyrants. ”
— Socrates

This brief reflection on the past shows us that the crisis of authority remains a highly subjective phenomenon. It must be studied in light of its contemporary manifestations.

In Qu’est-ce qu’un chef ? (What Is a Leader?), General de Villiers highlights the paradox of a crisis of authority accompanied by a strong demand for leadership.

How does this crisis of authority manifest, and how should we respond?

Authority should ultimately benefit those upon whom it is exercised. Without this, it will remain in perpetual crisis.

Authority: according to Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), authority is a form of power that requires neither persuasion nor coercion. Etymologically, it stems from “to augment.” Yet, it remains a form of domination.

The Crisis of Institutions Representing Authority

All the institutions that have traditionally represented authority no longer wield the power they once did.

The Church no longer exercises real authority over the behavior of the masses as it did before the late 19th century. Papal decrees no longer hold political influence.

Schools are a prime battleground for the contemporary crisis of authority. Some teachers struggle to maintain classroom discipline, and some even refuse to assert their authority. For instance, in 2018, a student in Créteil threatened his teacher with a weapon. Arendt noted that if authority is in crisis in education, it’s because “adults refuse to assume responsibility for the world into which they have placed children.” Moreover, the school’s failure to mitigate social inequalities has diminished its legitimacy.

This crisis is highly visible because it coincides with a crisis of power (distinct from authority) over physical bodies. Exercising control over bodies outside the economic realm is increasingly difficult. For example, the Universal National Service is controversial because it’s intended to be mandatory. Furthermore, discipline in schools is hard to enforce. The end of military service has removed the routine political control over bodies.

On closer analysis, however, this crisis of authority reveals itself as a crisis of legitimacy.

Crisis of Authority or Crisis of Legitimacy?

The crisis of authority is, in fact, a crisis of legitimacy.

Authority is grounded in legitimacy. In Economy and Society, Max Weber distinguishes three forms of legitimacy for authority:

Traditional authority, based on sacred respect for customs and those who hold power by tradition;
Legal-rational authority, grounded in the validity of laws established through legislative or bureaucratic means;
Charismatic authority, which relies on the devotion of followers to a leader with exceptional qualities.

In reality, these three forms of legitimacy are often intertwined.

Traditional authority has largely evaporated. Arendt noted that authority disappeared from the modern world due to the rise of totalitarian regimes in the 20th century, which challenged all forms of traditional authority.

Legal-rational authority is insufficient. In Le fil de l’épée (The Edge of the Sword), de Gaulle noted that rank alone is not enough to command obedience; it must be coupled with charisma. Today, as Christophe Guilluy points out in French Fractures, the political sphere has been discredited in favor of consensual or technical solutions, which are ill-suited to challenge economic domination.

Knowledge as a source of authority is now questioned, due to its easy accessibility through ICT. Michel Serres addresses this in Thumbelina, noting that knowledge is no longer the sole prerogative of teachers or doctors. Thus, the sources of authority in schools need to be redefined with new value added by teachers.

Authority is indeed in crisis, but our societies can address it.

How to Address the Crisis of Authority

While the crisis of authority is real, its consequences can be managed by placing humanity at the center of authority.

This involves aligning authority with human measures. According to General de Villiers in Qu’est ce qu’un chef ? (What Is a Leader?), at the heart of the crisis of authority is its dehumanization. We might question the role of leaders in the corporate sphere, their exemplarity, and their willingness to engage with subordinates. Indeed, their task is to maximize profitability, their workforce is easily replaceable, and they themselves are embedded in systems of domination and exploitation.

What Is Authority?

Authority is about uplifting others. Etymologically, “authority” comes from “to augment.” This is the condition sine qua non for the acceptance of authority: it must benefit the one who submits to it, as they do so voluntarily. The benefit is not material, like a salary, which would remain in the realm of power since individuals are compelled to earn a living. It is moral: belonging to a prestigious group, enhancing skills or personal qualities that one values. This explains the need for leadership noted by General de Villiers.

What About the Military?

The military experience serves as a laboratory for contemporary forms of authority. Uniquely, it trains leaders in the exercise of authority. It’s based on exemplarity and a leader’s ability to ensure the continuity of their unit (recruitment, rest, training). Leaders who deplete their unit without renewing its strength, who consume more than they build, see their authority diminish and are forced to rely on power. Moreover, the military operates in a realm insulated from profitability. Leaders serve their superiors by fulfilling missions and serve their subordinates by preparing them for engagement. They are not seeking to exploit them (in the Marxist sense). Finally, they are statutorily responsible for defending their subordinates’ interests.

By refocusing leadership on human needs, we can restore balance to the structures necessary for our society. This requires distancing ourselves from the neoliberal dogma, which culminates in a society of entirely “free” individuals, placed in competition and recognizing only the law of the market as legitimate.

However, the crisis of authority also reveals a deeper crisis of power that could fracture the cohesion of French society.

Additional Reflection

Notably, this “crisis of authority” actually benefits the dominant class.

There is no crisis of authority in prestigious Parisian high schools or elite universities. These institutions serve as legitimizing tools for the elite’s continued dominance through academic credentials (Bourdieu). There is also no crisis of authority in corporations generally, which maintain power dynamics. A disgruntled employee challenging the authority of their leader would quickly be shown the door.

It’s primarily the dominated classes who challenge authority, and only in the public sphere (the State, police, schools)—to their own detriment (hindering social mobility due to ignorance of the real rules of the game). This may be because authority and the State, as the visible face of power, are unconsciously, yet rightly, perceived as instruments of social domination. Economic domination, however, remains invisible and is even viewed as legitimate and natural.

The State and public authority may indeed serve as instruments of domination for the benefit of the ruling class. However, in France at least, they also act as bulwarks for the working class against economic power. The crisis of authority may thus stem from a self-destructive reaction to a vague sense of injustice. In this sense, we could say the crisis of authority benefits the dominant class. Perhaps, given its persistence over time, it serves the structural function of perpetuating the subordinate position of the dominated class, since the model being challenged remains the only one offering freedom, social justice, and security.

Could the real cause of the crisis of authority be class struggle?

Manufacturing Consent: The Press and Media According to Noam Chomsky

Posted on 20 August 2024 by Les armes et la toge

Understanding the Structural Submission of the Media to Dominant Power According to Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent

According to Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent, the Western mainstream media defends the power in place in a structural way.

According to Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent, mainstream Western media structurally defend the interests of the ruling power.

In Manufacturing Consent (1988), Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman identify five filters through which Western media align with the interests of dominant power. This means that the latter doesn’t need to resort to censorship.

Discover Ares and Athena, Gods of War.

Size, Ownership, and Profit Orientation

First, it’s important to remember that major media outlets are huge corporations run by billionaires or CEOs, who are themselves closely controlled by purely profit-driven interest groups. These companies, therefore, share common interests with other corporations, banks, and the government.

Advertising

The economic model of mainstream media relies on advertising. This dependency leads to an alignment with advertisers’ interests and a reduction in content quality.

Source Selection

Powerful institutions maintain a continuous flow of information to the media. These “official” sources (government, industrial groups, experts) are cheaper than sending a reporter into the field. Moreover, their information is readily accepted and requires no verification. Today, we can cite the media’s obsession with the Twitter accounts of political leaders, a convenient and free source.

Flak. Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent.

Any dissenting opinion faces a barrage of criticism from institutional actors, such as think tanks (often conservative), the government, or other media outlets.

Ideology

Lastly, information that aligns with the dominant ideology (at the time of Manufacturing Consent, anti-communism) is less likely to be scrutinized than information that challenges it.

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To summarize, according to Manufacturing Consent, mainstream media’s defense of ruling power interests is structural, almost invisible, and therefore much more effective than censorship.

Another topic : Charles de Gaulle, General Culture As The True School Of Command.

India: A Deceptive Power

Posted on 18 August 2024 by Les armes et la toge

Will India have the capacity to impose itself as a great power on the international scene?
India Great Power, Arms and toga.

New Delhi has nuclear weapons but is unable to electrify its entire territory. Under these circumstances, will India be able to establish itself as a great power on the international stage?

Over the next ten years, India is likely to be confined to a regional power role because it is a paper tiger and due to its relations with its neighbors.

The Assets of an Emerging Great Power

India possesses several assets that suggest it could become a great power in the short term.

Nuclear Power. New Delhi acquired nuclear weapons in 1998. It is believed to have around 100 nuclear warheads, bombers, and a nuclear-powered submarine (with a second one under construction).

Stable Political Regime. India is known as the “world’s largest democracy.” It manages to have 900 million voters in a stable system since 1947. However, the ruling party of Narendra Modi exploits religious divisions, which can sometimes lead to violence.

Desire for Power. India has a genuine desire for power. It has a prestigious past and sees itself as a great power. For instance, it attempted to send a probe to the Moon in July 2019.

However, India’s desire for power faces structural obstacles.

Limitations to India’s Power

Certain successes should not obscure the real limitations to India’s ambition for power.

An Illusory Economy

Although India shows a growth rate of 7%, higher than China’s, and has risen to the 6th largest economy globally, just ahead of France, it still faces deep challenges. The country struggles to feed its population. One in two children suffers from malnutrition. India needs to integrate 12 million new entrants into the labor market each year, requiring an 8% growth rate. Inequalities are increasing, and 20% of the population lives on less than $2 a day. Furthermore, South Asian economies are poorly integrated regionally: India’s trade with its neighbors accounts for only 2%.

Population and Territory Issues

While the population size (1.3 billion and growing) and territory size are power factors, India struggles to harness this space. Not the entire country is electrified. Additionally, while the population is large, the education system is inadequate, especially in rural areas: some schools lack teachers, and 25% of the population is illiterate. The state of public health is unsatisfactory, with the country spending only 1% of its GDP on health (compared to 11% for France). Some power factors thus become limitations to Indian power.

An Ineffective Military

Although India has nuclear weapons, its armed forces and military-industrial complex are actually underperforming. The Indian army has 1.2 million personnel, but its equipment is outdated. It is undergoing modernization, but its industrial and technological defense base cannot supply the needed equipment. As a result, India is the world’s largest arms importer, acquiring Scorpene submarines and Rafale jets.

Limited Soft Power

While India is known for its cuisine, yoga, and especially Bollywood, its diplomatic weight is overall insufficient. Some of its 160 embassies lack ambassadors. Moreover, it lacks a network of cultural centers like the Confucius Institutes or the Alliance Française.

These internal limitations are exacerbated by a contested regional environment.

A Contested Regional Environment that Could Limit India’s Power

Competition in India’s regional environment influences its internal situation and is likely to limit its power expansion in the medium term.

Border Conflicts. India’s borders remain geopolitical issues. China claims Arunachal Pradesh in the Himalayas, and Pakistan claims Kashmir. India has fought several border wars: in 1962 against China, which annexed Aksai Chin; against Pakistan in 1948 (status quo maintained), 1965, and 1971 (India’s victories). Skirmishes occurred in Kargil in 1999, with the latest clashes in 2019. The accession of both countries to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017 does not seem to have changed the situation.

These border conflicts fuel internal tensions. Kashmir, historically a tension point between Pakistan and India, sees a strong Indian military presence. Riots regularly erupt to protest against troop behavior. Pro-independence movements and jihadist groups have committed attacks (2001 against the Indian parliament, 2019 by Jaish e Mohammed against an Indian barracks). Pakistan supports some terrorist movements to defend its claims and tie down 600,000 Indian soldiers. This region, which requested attachment to India under pressure from Pakistani incursions in 1947, is strategic as it controls the Indus River, crucial for water supply to both India and Pakistan.

Competition with China. The competition between China and India seems to favor China. India’s Look East Policy, with a regional scope, is confronted by the globally oriented Belt and Road Initiative. China’s navy is superior to India’s. Economic competition also heavily favors China: India exports iron to China and imports manufactured goods, reflecting the relationship between a developing country and a developed neighbor. Finally, China firmly opposes India’s access to the UN Security Council.

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India’s aspirations for power may thus be hindered by its economic development limits and especially by a contested regional environment that weighs on its power policy.

However, the American reaction to the rise of Chinese power could provide India an opportunity to position itself as an important intermediary.

Understanding Absolute War and Real War in Clausewitz in Five Minutes

Posted on 16 August 2024 by Les armes et la toge

Absolute war, the realm of the rise to extremes, therefore only exists in theory. In real war, several principles of moderation prevent this rise to extremes.

In Books I and VIII of On War, Clausewitz develops the concept of rise to extremes, as well as those of “absolute” and “real” war.

Absolute war, theoretical war

From the start of Book I, Clausewitz offers a definition of war. It is “an act of force by which we seek to force the adversary to submit to our will”. From there, incapacitating oneself from the enemy becomes an intermediate goal. This is the condition for bending it to our will.

In a purely logical approach, Clausewitz shows that in theory this “act of force” which is war can only go to extremes. It is absolute war (for war taken in the absolute, in its principle).

Three “reciprocal actions” allow the rise to extremes according to Clausewitz.

– Unlimited reciprocal use of force. He who makes the most complete use of it has an advantage over his enemy. The latter is then forced to do the same.

– The search for the overthrow of the adversary. Each of the two camps tries to submit the other to its will. He will therefore try to reduce his enemy to impotence. Neither of them is therefore safe until the other is unable to defend themselves.

– Calculation of the necessary efforts and escalation. Each of the two opponents calculates the efforts that will be necessary to surpass the other. This can only lead to a perpetual gradation leading to extremes.

The rise to extremes is therefore an unlimited use of force. Because of these three “reciprocal actions”, in the world of ideas, the natural movement of war leads to the rise to extremes.

Actual war

However, the theoretical principle of rising to extremes does not apply in actual warfare . Indeed, in real war there are brakes on this rise to extremes.

Real war cannot go to extremes

The belligerents are not abstract entities emerging from nothing for instant confrontation. They know each other, and are able to estimate the will of their opponent. This introduces a first principle of moderation .

Furthermore, war has a duration. An error in estimating the enemy’s will can therefore be repaired. This introduces a second possibility of reciprocal moderation. And even in case of defeat, the result is never final.

There are other obstacles to achieving absolute war. This is the case with human weaknesses such as indecision or imperfection of judgment; or else friction in the conduct of war by state apparatuses. Finally, low stakes can discourage rise to extremes.

Real war has limits

The limits of the use of force in real war will therefore not be positioned at the extremes. They will be determined by calculation, reasoning and probabilities.

These terminals will be placed according to the political goal. It will require more or less significant efforts for one, and will provoke a greater or lesser will to fight in the other.

It is this political goal which will determine the result that military action must achieve.

Absolute war , the realm of the rise to extremes, therefore only exists in theory. In real war, several principles of moderation prevent this rise to extremes. While Clausewitz recognizes that trying to avoid bloodshed in war would go against the essence of war, he does not recommend introducing rise to the extremes of violence into actual war. The rise to extremes is only a theoretical object which is intended to remain so.

However, and this is the usefulness of the theory, this concept must be kept in mind as the natural direction of all war.

The principle of moderation in war

This leads us to analyze a quote from the master that is often repeated, but often misunderstood:

“it will always be an absurdity to want to introduce a principle of moderation into war.”

On War , p. 28

Taken in this way, it would be the profession of faith of a Clausewitz apostle of the rise to extremes, who would advocate maximum use of force without taking into account the laws and customs of war or the political context. The indiscriminate unleashing of violence would be the only way to win.

Nothing could be more false, nothing more criminal against the thought of the master. Let’s put the quote in context:

“If the wars of civilized peoples are much less cruel and devastating than those of unsophisticated peoples, this is due to the social state of the former and their international relations. War is influenced by this state and these relationships which modify and temper it, but these elements remain foreign to it, a simple external fact , so that it will always be an absurdity to want to introduce a principle of moderation into war.”

On War, p. 28. Emphasis added.

If war taken in theory has no moderating principle and naturally rises to extremes, real war is in fact moderate. However, the moderating element comes not from the nature of war itself, but from its environment. He nonetheless has a very real influence. The maxim which closes our quotation therefore only applies to absolute war. It is anything but a negation of moderation in the reality of war.

This brings us closer to one of the major themes of On War , which is that war should not be considered as an autonomous phenomenon, but as a political phenomenon subject to political decisions. But addressing it here would take us beyond five minutes…

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Thus, if he places violence at the heart of war, both absolute and real, Clausewitz in no way recommends giving free rein to unbridled violence to achieve victory. The rise to extremes is a theoretical object which is not intended to be embodied in real war. The latter is indeed marked by several limitations external to its nature.

“We are thus led to consider war not as it should be according to its concept, but as it is in reality, that is to say with all the foreign elements which are introduced into it and modify it »

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War , Book VIII

EDITOR’S NOTE:

Some authors consider that absolute war could occur in reality, as in the case of nuclear war. In book VIII, Clausewitz himself indicates that the Napoleonic wars brought absolute war to earth.

However, it seems to us that even in the event of an outbreak of extreme violence, a certain number of obstacles would remain. For example, due to the friction that would arise in the units responsible for annihilating opposing cities, such as disagreements, equipment malfunction, hesitation or even refusal to obey. The fact that a war can take an apocalyptic form does not mean that it would be without brakes.

The hypothesis according to which absolute war is an ideal (in the theoretical sense of a pure and perfect form of war) which would serve as a compass to understand the direction taken by real war seems to us the richest. Quite simply, without this the concept of absolute war would not be of much interest.

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See our other articles on Clausewitz.

War as a continuation of politics by other means

The astonishing trinity in Clausewitz, and why the master describes war as a chameleon

Friction in Clausewitz

The center of gravity in Clausewitz

Is France a maritime power?

Posted on 14 August 2024 by Les armes et la toge

France has the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. However, its fishing fleet is declining and its navy is regularly falling in the ranking of world navies. Does France have a real ambition for maritime power?

Despite the size of its EEZ, France does not seem to have the desire to be a maritime power.

Is France a maritime power? The mirage of space

The French EEZ is little developed, but not very valuable.

Strong potential

The French EEZ (200 miles around the French coast) is 11 million km ². Polynesia alone has an EEZ of 4 million ^km2 . It is the 2nd ^largest in the world after that of the United States. Its maritime domain, even more extensive, is the 1st ⁱⁿ the world. However, this area is not very coherent since it extends over the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans.

NB the maritime domain of a country extends over an area of 350 miles around its coasts. Unlike the EEZ, the maritime domain does not include the water column, but only the soil and subsoil.

The sea: a primary, but also industrial, sector with high added value

The French maritime economy represents 300,000 direct jobs (for reference, the automobile sector represents 220,000). Naval Group and the Atlantic shipyards (3,000 employees) have strong technological and industrial know-how . In these times of deindustrialization , the maritime economy is therefore a key sector.

Few resources

However, this EEZ and this maritime domain contain few resources apart from fisheries resources. They contain little or no hydrocarbons: research in Guyana has been abandoned . Only scattered islands could contain oil. If it is likely that rare earths are found in the subsoil of the French maritime domain, their research and exploitation would represent a technical and financial challenge.

A fishing fleet in difficulty

The EEZ therefore only contains fishery resources. However, the French fishing fleet is in difficulty. Its boats are few and diminishing. Brittany was home to 3,000 fishing vessels in 1995, compared to 1,300 today. The boats are small, 80% are less than 12 m. They are also old, with an average age of 27 years. Maintenance is therefore expensive and profitability declines . The situation is even more difficult overseas. The entire Polynesian EEZ only allows the capture of 13,600 tonnes of fish per year, while the Fiji Islands alone catch 44,000 tonnes per year. In addition, this fishing is essentially coastal, it overexploits the coasts to the detriment of the open sea.

The size of its EEZ also creates difficulties in asserting France’s sovereignty.

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A sovereignty difficult to assert

While the French maritime space could be a source of power, the difficulties of the French Navy in controlling it make it a reason for fragility.

Is France a maritime power? A national navy in decline

The French Navy has 120 ships of more than 100 tonnes . It ranks 7th ⁱⁿ the world of navies , but the general trend is towards the development of naval forces everywhere in the world, except in Europe and the United States. It could therefore see itself caught up in the coming years, particularly by South Korea. In reality, the French navy lacks resources in relation to the area it has to control. For example, it only deploys 2 surveillance frigates per ocean . The United States Navy is 10 times larger in tonnage, while the two EEZs are approximately the same size.

However, the national navy has assets which rank it among the leading navies in the world despite its tonnage . Its ability to fight and resupply on the high seas, to project forces or its carrier group represent rare capabilities, the result of significant investments.

The distances cause difficulties in asserting France’s sovereignty over its maritime zone

Thus, the Clipperton Atoll, off the coast of Mexico, is only visited once a year by a vessel of the French Navy. The atoll is uninhabited, but has an airstrip, regularly used by drug traffickers with complete impunity.

France therefore sees its sovereignty called into question in places

Thus, the scattered islands are claimed by Madagascar, which is supported by the UN general assembly. However, the EEZ of these islands could contain oil, and in any case they make it possible to control the Mozambique Channel. As a result, they are almost all inhabited by a gendarme and military detachments are stationed there. These are the forces of sovereignty.

All this does not prevent certain successes in the fight against drug trafficking in the Antilles or against piracy . Thus, thanks to the European operation Atalanta, piracy off the coast of Somalia has almost disappeared.

The source of these difficulties is that France does not really have the desire to be a maritime power.

A lack of will

It is due to a lack of political will that the maritime space is transformed into a weakness instead of being a power multiplier.

No port strategy

Le Havre, ^{the leading} French container port, is only 56th ⁱⁿ the world. In fact, one container in two destined for France does not pass through French ports. However, the 2018 national port strategy is limited to the merger of the ports of Paris, Le Havre and Rouen, and the rapprochement of Mediterranean ports. Édouard Philippe even declared in substance in 2018 that there was no real port strategy in France. The success of CMA-CGM, the 3rd ^maritime transport company in the world, should not overshadow the reality of the absence of a national strategy.

Weak investment in Marine Renewable Energy (MRE)

The vast French EEZ could be used for the development of MREs. However, there is little productive infrastructure, such as a few tidal farms or the Rance tidal power plant (which has a power of 57 MWatts, compared to 1 GW for a nuclear power plant). The rest is in the experimental stage. The State finances research through aid, to the tune of 3 million euros per year. MRE are the poor relation of renewable energies, which give priority to solar and wind power. The French ambition is to have a production of 100 MW in 2023. For comparison, Scotland already produces a power of 1 GW thanks to EMR.

A global disinterest

The sea is not a priority for France. Its issues were not the subject of any major speech by the president . The priority given to the construction of the new aircraft carrier, understandable in view of nuclear deterrence , shows that France sees above all in the sea an environment allowing the projection of power and the protection of its territory through deterrence . Effective control of its maritime space will remain problematic despite the planned entry into service of Oceanic Patrollers and Overseas Patrollers. Certainly, France has embarked on freedom of navigation operations (this involves navigating in contested waters) to assert its global role, but this is not enough to make it a maritime power.

This French distance from the sea has its roots in the long term . For a long time, the question of maritime power was posed in opposition to continental security. Unable to make an effort everywhere, France resolved its dilemma at the expense of the sea. Despite some successes, its navy was never able to compete with the Royal Navy .

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France therefore does not give itself the means to be a great maritime power. France’s relative disinterest in the sea can be understood by the historical tension between the country’s security, which has long required giving priority to land forces, and its power, which is expressed on the seas.

The shift of the world towards Asia and the period of peace experienced by the European Union could change this paradigm, unless regular tensions in the East bring this French dilemma back into focus.

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Does Trade Promote Peace?

Posted on 13 August 2024 by Les armes et la toge

Does trade promote peace? This is a received idea since Montesquieu’s “sweet commerce”. However, we will see that it is rather the opposite.

Trade promotes peace: the theory of sweet trade

In On the Spirit of Laws , Montesquieu makes the connection between trade and peace:

“The natural effect of commerce is to bring about peace”Montesquieu, of the spirit of the laws

Indeed, trade promotes mutual knowledge, travel, exchanges with others. As a result, he softened morals, both on a political and individual level.

“It is almost a general rule that wherever there are gentle morals, there is commerce, and that wherever there is commerce, there are gentle morals.”Montesquieu, of the spirit of the laws

It also creates mutual interests between nations. If the business elites of country A do business with those of country B (investments, flows), political leaders should be less inclined to break these ties through war. Indeed, political and economic elites are often closely linked, and the wealth provided by trade benefits, in certain cases, both parties.

However, it is very easy to find examples in history of countries closely linked by trade which went to war with each other. The best known is that of the First World War. Trade between France and Germany was very high in 1914, which did not prevent the conflict. So we need to dig deeper to understand the relationship between trade and war.

Trade, wealth, power… and war

Let us start from the postulate that trade is a source of wealth, which allows the increase in the power of the State which controls it. This wealth makes it possible to build or strengthen one’s military capacity: to set up and equip armies and fleets. On this subject, read our article The thalassocratic system in Thucydides.

It is indeed also necessary to protect this source of wealth. The development of war fleets goes hand in hand with that of commerce. We have already talked about Melos , who was forced to confront the Athenians despite its neutrality. Its geographical position would allow anyone who controls it to pose an unacceptable threat to the Athenian economic system . Today, the West is obliged to protect its lines of communication in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks through war .

This last example shows that trade can turn into vulnerability. When a state becomes overly dependent on its trade for supplies and wealth, its lines of communication become a target. This is where France’s maritime strategy came from in the 18th ^and 19th ^centuries . Faced with the superiority of the British squadrons, France fell back on naval warfare. It seeks to hinder British supplies, and to drive up the price of insurance (like today in the Red Sea). On this subject, read chapter 6 of The Measurement of Force .

Trade, one interest among others: it only modestly promotes peace

Trade therefore increases wealth, military capabilities and provides vulnerability to attack. But this does not detract from the relevance of the argument of mutual dependence, however invalidated by historical experience. For what ?

The question to ask is in reality: are there interests greater than those of commerce, which could push political entities to go to war despite strong commercial ties? Asking the question reveals the futility of linking trade and peace. Political interest remains greater than economic interest.

Without reviewing the causes of wars, innumerable and always singular, let us simply note that there are many cases in which a state would have an interest in going to war against another despite strong commercial ties.

Failing to honor one’s alliances has a political cost much greater than the temporary destruction of economic ties. This is a small part of the mechanism that leads to the First World War.

A balance of power with a threatening power on the verge of overthrow. England has long based its policy on the balance of power on the European continent.

Political opportunity: the seizure of a key territory can bring long-term gains far beyond the economic costs of a conflict. This is the calculation made, wrongly, by Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Finally, a marked ideological opposition does not prevent maintaining commercial relations. But the latter will carry no weight if a conflict breaks out between two political entities with incompatible political projects. This is the case with Germany’s expansion at the start of World War II.

NB Many examples centered on Europe and the contemporary period. Do not hesitate to note in the comments other cases where political interest has swept aside economic interest… or the opposite.

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To conclude, does trade promote peace? No, or at least very modestly. Making the agent of peace trade amounts to giving him power that he does not have. Indeed, the political project of a nation does not resolve to maintain good commercial relations with its neighbors or competitors. Commerce and wealth are means to a larger political end. It is according to this political end that wars are declared. The depth of economic ties can therefore only marginally counterbalance the weight of political data.

On the contrary, by its very existence commerce favors war because it is necessary to protect it against its competitors, or because it provides an adversary with an opportunity to influence the political decisions of a nation through violence.

To go further:

On Montesquieu: Catherine Larrère, “Montesquieu and “sweet commerce”: a paradigm of liberalism”, Cahiers d’histoire. Critical History Review.

On maritime strategy, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Traité de Stratégie, Paris, Economica, 2011 .