In his Introduction to Strategy, General André Beaufre places significant emphasis on nuclear strategy. He combines nuclear deterrence with conventional capabilities.
THE IMPORTANCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON
The nuclear weapon is not just a more powerful weapon; it grants its possessor a new strategic dimension. On the one hand, it can strike any point on the planet. On the other, it disrupts the traditional correlation between a state’s power and the size of its armed forces.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY ACCORDING TO ANDRÉ BEAUFRE
Nuclear deterrence is rooted in uncertainty but must be complemented by conventional forces.
Read also Strategy according to General Beaufre’s “Introduction to Strategy”.
Nuclear Deterrence
According to General Beaufre, the credibility of nuclear deterrence depends on evaluating the balance between gains and losses. Leaders must feign irrationality, creating the impression they are willing to provoke disaster. This uncertainty becomes the only constant and the key to deterrence. Maintaining this uncertainty is essential.
There are two types of tactics:
- Counterforce: Targeting enemy military forces, particularly nuclear delivery systems. This requires substantial resources.
- Countervalue: Targeting the enemy’s major cities. The idea of using this strategy is so horrifying that it implies reliance on deterrence alone. However, it proves less intimidating and essentially offers only a scenario of mutual destruction.
Complementary Deterrence
Despite nuclear capabilities, each adversary retains some degree of freedom for action, whether in secondary theaters or minor engagements. Deterrence must therefore be supplemented, either through expeditionary conventional forces or by maintaining the risk of nuclear retaliation in local conflicts (tactical nuclear weapons).
Having a robust conventional force enables near-total deterrence, as the escalation of conventional conflict would inevitably lead to nuclear extremes.
WAR STRATEGY
The strategy for nuclear warfare differs from that of deterrence.
Given the risk of mutual destruction, a conflict between nuclear powers would likely begin with limited actions.
From this starting point, there are two main doctrines:
- Massive Retaliation: Launching nuclear strikes to eliminate the adversary in response to any aggression, however minor. It should be noted that the United States abandoned the doctrine of massive retaliation as soon as the USSR became capable of striking American soil.
- Flexible Response: Using only the necessary force while reserving the option for massive nuclear retaliation.
According to Beaufre, in the nuclear era, only two types of wars are feasible between nuclear powers: the fait accompli strategy or prolonged low-intensity conflict.
CONCLUSION
Nuclear strategy holds a central place in General Beaufre’s work. The nuclear weapon enables its possessor to achieve a new strategic stature. However, it does not render conventional forces obsolete, as the ability to act below the nuclear threshold remains essential.