Objective control in Huntington’s theory

In his 1957 book The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington introduced the concept of objective civilian control over the military. His work became a key reference in military sociology and strategic studies. In it, he developed a theory on the relationship between the military and the state.

Objective control in Huntington’s theory

One of the central ideas in his analysis is that of objective control. According to Huntington, this model represents the optimal way to manage civil–military relations in a democratic state. Unlike what he calls subjective control, Huntington argues that objective control effectively balances civilian authority and military expertise.

This article will examine the concept of objective control, its principles, advantages, and challenges within the framework of democratic governance.

Theoretical context: civilian versus military

The idea of separating civilian and military spheres dates back to antiquity. However, Huntington reformulated it within the modern context of liberal democracies. The central question he sought to answer was this: How can a democracy preserve military competence while ensuring civilian control over the armed forces?

Huntington criticized earlier approaches in which civilian authorities sought to directly limit or subordinate military power by imposing strict oversight on military decisions and actions. Such interference, he argued, often led to inefficiency and reduced operational effectiveness. To solve this problem, Huntington proposed a form of control based on a delicate balance—objective control.

What is objective control according to Huntington?

Objective control is based on one fundamental idea: allowing the military to exercise its professional expertise while ensuring obedience to civilian authority. Unlike subjective control—which relies on co-optation, politicization, or the integration of military elites into civilian political structures—objective control advocates strict professional autonomy for the armed forces.

This concept rests on two key principles:

Military specialization

Huntington argued that the armed forces should be composed of professionals trained specifically in defense matters. Military expertise, he wrote, is a unique domain not shared by civilian authorities, who lack the technical training to make such judgments.

Non-interference of civilians in internal military affairs

For Huntington, the best way for civilians to control the military is not through daily interference but by granting them the autonomy necessary to fulfill their mission. Civilian leaders define strategic goals, while the military determines how best to achieve them.

See also: General Beaufre’s Indirect Strategy.

Subjective vs. objective control in Huntington’s theory

Subjective control, according to Huntington, is one possible model of civil–military relations. It relies on reducing military autonomy and seeks to merge the military sphere with the civilian political one. In modern democracies, this often manifests as the politicization of the armed forces, where senior officers are co-opted by political leaders to serve partisan interests. Huntington saw this as a threat—not only to democratic stability but also to the effectiveness of the military itself. When the army becomes politicized or reduced to an extension of political power struggles, it loses both neutrality and competence.

By contrast, objective control maintains a clear separation between the two spheres. By delegating to the military the technical management of force, while preserving clear political subordination, the state maintains both its authority over strategic decisions and the operational effectiveness of its forces.

Advantages of objective control

Autonomy and professional expertise

One major advantage of objective control is that it preserves military competence. Allowing professionals to handle operational matters ensures the efficient and expert execution of strategic decisions.

Prevention of military politicization

Objective control prevents the military from becoming a political actor, which is essential to democratic stability. A politically neutral, professional army is less likely to engage in political intrigue or coups.

Clear subordination to civilian authority

By assigning the military technical control over its own functions while civilians set political goals, the democratic state maintains strategic oversight of the armed forces. This subordination is vital to uphold the primacy of civilian authority.

See also: Understanding Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach

Limits and criticisms of Huntington’s objective control

Despite its advantages, the concept of objective control has faced criticism. Some argue that this model can grant the military excessive autonomy, allowing it to gain disproportionate influence within the state. Others view the model as overly rigid, suggesting that civil–military relations require more flexible adjustments depending on political contexts and security threats.

Another challenge lies in the potential gap between civilians and the military, leading to a loss of mutual understanding. If the military becomes too isolated in its professional sphere, it may develop a culture disconnected from political realities and, ultimately, from national strategy itself.


Huntington’s concept of objective control remains a cornerstone of civil–military relations theory. By delegating professional competence to the military while maintaining clear civilian control over strategic decisions, Huntington offered a pragmatic solution to the tension between military autonomy and civilian authority. However, this model requires ongoing attention to avoid the risks that come with an excessive separation between war and politics.

Ogun, god of war and iron

Ogun, god of war and iron, holds a major place in traditional African religions, particularly among the Yoruba and the Fon. Worshiped across several regions of West Africa and throughout the diaspora, he embodies strength, warrior power, and the technology associated with metallurgy. His attributes include iron tools, weapons, and animals that symbolize strength and determination. Ogun represents war in its most brutal and destructive form. He is also a god of justice, hunting, and protection. His ancient and rich cult reflects the complexities of both war and human society.

Ogun plays a key role in African religions, especially among the Yoruba and the Fon. His name echoes through the stories of peoples who revere him for his power and his essential role in metallurgy and warfare. This god embodies not only the violence of conflict but also justice, protection, and technological progress.

Ogun, god of war

Ogun, god of war in West Africa

Ogun is worshiped in West Africa, particularly in Nigeria, Benin, and Togo. He represents raw strength and the ability to dominate the environment through iron technology. The Yoruba and the Fon—renowned blacksmiths and warriors—have worshiped him since ancient times. They integrated his cult into daily life and wartime rituals.

In precolonial times, blacksmiths dedicated their work to Ogun, seeing him as the very spirit of steel. They offered animal sacrifices before using their iron tools. Without his power, no weapon could be properly forged. Ogun also ruled over warfare, as he provided the raw material for all weapons: iron.

With the transatlantic slave trade, Ogun’s cult spread to the Americas, particularly Cuba, Brazil, and Haiti. There, it took on new forms within Haitian Vodou and Brazilian Candomblé. In Haiti, Ogun—known as Ogou—became a central figure in the struggle for freedom among enslaved people. His followers prayed to him before battles or important actions, seeking his protection and blessing. Even today, his cult remains strong in the African diaspora, representing the fight for survival, justice, and transformation.

Ogun, master of iron and the forge

Ogun is the master of iron and the forge. His main attributes include all metal tools and weapons. A hammer, axe, sword, and spear are often used to represent him. The machete embodies his ability to open new paths, to clear and transform the world.

Animals are also associated with Ogun : the dog and the boar symbolize loyalty, ferocity, and raw power. The boar represents tenacity and rage—the qualities Ogun displays in battle. The dog represents faithfulness and protection. His devotees seek these traits both in war and daily life.

Ogun also wears chains and shackles, symbols of capture and domination in warfare, but also of justice, as he embodies law and the punishment of wrongdoers. His followers often sacrifice dogs, roosters, or other animals in his honor. It is common to see iron tools placed on his altars.

Iron, the material of his attributes, also represents technological progress. Through his link to the forge, Ogun embodies not only destruction but also creation. He allows humans to craft tools that change the world.

Ogun, brutal and destructive god

Ogun embodies the brutal, destructive, and unstoppable aspect of war. He is the god who charges forward with iron weapons, mercilessly breaking enemy lines. Warriors invoke Ogun before battle, hoping to receive his blessing and invincible strength. Iron—both tool and weapon—gives Ogun his dominion over war.

The peoples of West Africa, especially the Yoruba and the Fon, long viewed war as essential to survival. Conflicts over land or resources were frequent, and Ogun stood at the heart of these struggles. Every battle required reliable tools, which only blacksmiths blessed by Ogun could create. His role extended beyond craftsmanship—he symbolized the fighting spirit and endurance needed to prevail.

In the diaspora, especially in Haiti, Ogun gained new meaning during revolutions against colonial powers. During the Haitian War of Independence, enslaved people and revolutionary leaders invoked Ogun before combat, praying for his fighting spirit to guide them to victory. This connection with war became so strong that many now view Ogun as a patron of revolutions and liberation struggles.

Ogun also represents the moral dimension of war. Though associated with violence and destruction, he punishes traitors and rewards those who fight for just causes. His wars are never meaningless—they aim to restore order or protect the vulnerable. His followers believe he enforces the laws of war and ensures justice is served once the fighting ends.

God of iron

Ogun is not only a god of war; he is also a deity of justice, hunting, roads, and technology. As the god of iron, he rules over all professions involving this metal—blacksmiths, hunters, and builders alike. Every iron tool, whether for war or agriculture, depends on Ogun’s power.

Protector of travelers

His role as protector of roads and pathways is equally important. Travelers offer sacrifices to Ogun before setting out to ensure his protection. Iron, the material of tools and weapons, also symbolizes the creation of infrastructure connecting communities. In this sense, Ogun is a god of progress and civilization. He embodies the transformation of raw nature into an ordered human world.

Justice

Justice is another central facet of his identity. As a war god, he punishes those who break the rules or betray their comrades. He imposes harsh—often deadly—penalties but also rewards heroes and virtuous people. Those seeking justice or vengeance invoke Ogun, hoping the god will intervene to restore balance.

Protector of hunters

In regions where his cult is strong, particularly Nigeria and Benin, Ogun protects hunters. They rely on his blessings to succeed in their expeditions. Hunting, though seemingly peaceful, is also a form of war against nature. Ogun, master of weapons and tools, allows humans to dominate natural forces in order to survive.

Ogun also plays an important role in religious ceremonies. As an ancestral deity, he receives regular sacrifices and presides over rituals linked to war, hunting, justice, and travel. These rituals—often accompanied by dance and song—celebrate his strength and his ability to transform human life through technology and the controlled use of violence to maintain order.

Ogun, god of war, iron, and justice, embodies a brutal yet necessary force within the societies that worshiped him. From antiquity to the present day, his cult has spread across West Africa and the African diaspora. As a symbol of war and technological progress, Ogun has shaped the history of his peoples—both on the battlefield and in the forge. His many roles make him a complex deity: both destroyer and creator, guarantor of order and chaos, and above all, protector of the paths his followers walk through the ages.

See also: God of War, Gods of War

General Beaufre’s Indirect Strategy

For General André Beaufre, indirect strategy is an indispensable complement to nuclear deterrence. In a world locked down by atomic weapons, the only remaining freedom of action lies in indirect strategy.

General Beaufre's Indirect Strategy
French soldier in Indochina, 1954.

You can start by reading our article on Nuclear Strategy According to General Beaufre.

Beaufre vs. Liddell Hart: Indirect Approach or Indirect Strategy?

In Strategy, Liddell Hart theorized the indirect approach. His central idea was to overturn the balance of opposing forces before the battle by maneuver rather than combat.


Read our article on Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach.

However, this approach remains tied to geography and military victory. André Beaufre refines this concept, stripping away its limitations to develop indirect strategy. This strategy seeks decisive outcomes through means other than military victory.

Why an Indirect Strategy?

With nuclear weapons, freedom of action in conflicts diminishes. However, it must still be exploited, as it is the only way to shift the status quo. This requires subtle methods that make war almost unrecognizable.

Conception of Indirect Maneuver

Beaufre’s indirect strategy relies on two types of maneuvers: external and internal.

External Maneuver

In Beaufre’s vision, freedom of action does not depend on operations on the ground but on external factors.

The core of the maneuver unfolds outside the battlefield. The aim is to limit the adversary’s freedom of action on international and domestic stages through political, economic, and diplomatic means. However, this requires credible deterrence (nuclear or conventional) and a coherent political line. Beaufre’s indirect strategy must also target the adversary’s psychology.

Internal Maneuver

Military operations conducted in the geographical space where results are desired are called internal maneuvers. In indirect strategy, these operations are not the main effort, which lies in external maneuvering. They are based on three variables: material forces, moral forces, and duration.

  • If material forces are strong, moral forces can be weaker, and the conflict must be short.
  • If material forces are weaker, moral forces must be stronger, and the war will last longer. The preferred tactic is maneuver through attrition.

Maneuver Through Attrition

This involves forcing a much stronger adversary to accept unfavorable peace conditions by using limited means against them. The weakness of military forces is compensated by the superiority of moral forces over time.

Material Aspect

For the weaker party, the goal is endurance. The most suitable method is guerrilla warfare. Two key concepts underpin this approach:

  1. Deterring the population from informing the enemy through systematic terror.
  2. Expanding the threat geographically to create a protection dilemma for the enemy. The more troops they deploy for protection, the less they can act offensively, thereby weakening them.

The establishment of sanctuaries is also critical. These sanctuaries provide external resources (personnel, arms, supplies) and may be protected by nuclear deterrence if located within the territory of a nuclear-armed ally. However, guerrilla forces may still suffer significant attrition. For instance, in the 1950s, the Malayan insurgency partially failed because the British successfully deprived it of sanctuaries.

Psychological Aspect

Endurance is also key here. A clear and appealing political vision, combined with confidence in ultimate victory (e.g., Marxist emphasis on the inevitability of historical progress), can mobilize popular passions.

In such conflicts, psychological tactics are crucial. “The only successes are psychological,” writes Beaufre. Material victories must lead to psychological triumphs; otherwise, they are pointless.

The synergy between internal and external maneuvers allows conflicts to last, enabling significant gains at minimal costs.

The Artichoke Maneuver (or Salami Tactic)

This tactic involves a military action based on fait accompli, followed by a pause, and then its repetition elsewhere.

The internal maneuver requires a military success within 48 hours, such as the Anschluss or Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. External maneuvering is essential to secure freedom of action. The objective must appear limited to be acceptable to international opinion.

Countering Indirect Strategy According to Beaufre

Countering External Maneuver

External maneuvering is essential for guerrilla operations. The counter-strategy involves adopting an offensive political stance to threaten the vulnerabilities of the adversary and its allies. It also entails multiplying deterrents: maintaining nuclear deterrence, deploying complementary deterrents, and threatening enemy geographical and ideological positions.

On the ideological front, Beaufre noted that during decolonization wars, the West’s weakness lay in its inability to offer the Third World a sufficiently social model. Restoring the prestige of Western civilization was crucial to ensuring its success. Beaufre advocated for a unified Western organization to develop a global strategy.


Read also Beaufre’s Nuclear Strategy.

Countering Internal Maneuver

In key territories, the primary goal is to prevent a fait accompli. Against maneuver through attrition, the stronger party must adopt a political strategy to counter the adversary’s strengths, focusing on prestige and reforms. Militarily, this means countering guerrilla tactics by emphasizing psychological efforts, accepting some insecurity, allowing the adversary to establish a foothold to destroy it, and sealing borders tightly. However, enduring requires significant resources, and internal counter-maneuvers are a direct response to indirect attacks.

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Indirect strategy complements nuclear deterrence. The key remains freedom of action, which hinges on external maneuvering. Psychology plays a decisive role. However, in the final analysis, force is still indispensable.

General Beaufre’s Nuclear Strategy

In his Introduction to Strategy, General André Beaufre places significant emphasis on nuclear strategy. He combines nuclear deterrence with conventional capabilities.

General Beaufre's Nuclear Strategy

THE IMPORTANCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON

The nuclear weapon is not just a more powerful weapon; it grants its possessor a new strategic dimension. On the one hand, it can strike any point on the planet. On the other, it disrupts the traditional correlation between a state’s power and the size of its armed forces.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY ACCORDING TO ANDRÉ BEAUFRE

Nuclear deterrence is rooted in uncertainty but must be complemented by conventional forces.


Read also Strategy according to General Beaufre’s “Introduction to Strategy”.

Nuclear Deterrence

According to General Beaufre, the credibility of nuclear deterrence depends on evaluating the balance between gains and losses. Leaders must feign irrationality, creating the impression they are willing to provoke disaster. This uncertainty becomes the only constant and the key to deterrence. Maintaining this uncertainty is essential.

There are two types of tactics:

  • Counterforce: Targeting enemy military forces, particularly nuclear delivery systems. This requires substantial resources.
  • Countervalue: Targeting the enemy’s major cities. The idea of using this strategy is so horrifying that it implies reliance on deterrence alone. However, it proves less intimidating and essentially offers only a scenario of mutual destruction.

Complementary Deterrence

Despite nuclear capabilities, each adversary retains some degree of freedom for action, whether in secondary theaters or minor engagements. Deterrence must therefore be supplemented, either through expeditionary conventional forces or by maintaining the risk of nuclear retaliation in local conflicts (tactical nuclear weapons).

Having a robust conventional force enables near-total deterrence, as the escalation of conventional conflict would inevitably lead to nuclear extremes.

WAR STRATEGY

The strategy for nuclear warfare differs from that of deterrence.

Given the risk of mutual destruction, a conflict between nuclear powers would likely begin with limited actions.

From this starting point, there are two main doctrines:

  • Massive Retaliation: Launching nuclear strikes to eliminate the adversary in response to any aggression, however minor. It should be noted that the United States abandoned the doctrine of massive retaliation as soon as the USSR became capable of striking American soil.
  • Flexible Response: Using only the necessary force while reserving the option for massive nuclear retaliation.

According to Beaufre, in the nuclear era, only two types of wars are feasible between nuclear powers: the fait accompli strategy or prolonged low-intensity conflict.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear strategy holds a central place in General Beaufre’s work. The nuclear weapon enables its possessor to achieve a new strategic stature. However, it does not render conventional forces obsolete, as the ability to act below the nuclear threshold remains essential.

Strategy according to General Beaufre’s “Introduction to Strategy”

In Introduction à la stratégie (Introduction to Strategy), French General André Beaufre presents the conclusions of his reflections on strategy in a dense, concise, and clear text.

André Beaufre, introduction to strategy

According to Beaufre, the meaning of the term “strategy” is often misunderstood. Historically, it was the science and art of supreme command, transmitted by example. However, with the evolution of warfare, this empirical transmission became obsolete, giving way to strategic research.

Nevertheless, this research remains inevitably influenced by the conflicts of its time. Only an abstract approach truly allows one to grasp the nature of strategy.

The Purpose of Strategy According to Beaufre

Before defining strategy, one must understand its purpose. Strategy does not unfold in a vacuum; it has a clear goal:

“The purpose of strategy is to achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Beaufre’s Definition of Strategy

Following the purpose, comes the definition. The famous definition of strategy appears early in Beaufre’s work. It is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.”

In war, each side seeks the opponent’s acceptance of the conditions it wishes to impose. Ultimately, it’s about convincing the other that continuing the fight is futile. Strategy thus targets the opponent’s will.

It is by placing a strategic problem within the psychological terrain of the adversary that one can properly assess the decisive factors. Therefore, the goal is to “reach a decision by creating and exploiting a situation that leads to a moral disintegration of the opponent, sufficient to make them accept the conditions one wants to impose.”

Thus, both sides aim simultaneously for the moral disintegration of the other. Strategic action is therefore dialectical: each side seeks to act while countering the actions of the other. Strategy becomes a struggle for freedom of action.

In the final analysis, according to Beaufre, strategy should be considered an art, as it requires the strategist to assess key elements based solely on their judgment. It is impossible to establish a set of rules that would apply in every circumstance.

The Means of Strategy According to Beaufre

Both belligerants choose their means by confronting the possibilities and vulnerabilities of the adversary. The question becomes: who do we want to defeat?

This leads to very concrete questions. For example: is capturing the enemy’s capital essential or not? Is the enemy particularly sensitive to human losses? The goal is to find the best way to achieve moral disintegration. From this confrontation of possibilities and the adversary’s vulnerabilities, a strategic objective emerges.

Strategic “Models”

General Beaufre identifies five strategic “models” based on means and objectives:

  1. Very powerful means for a modest objective: exerting a direct threat (nuclear deterrence).
  2. Modest objective, but insufficient means: limited freedom of action, requiring indirect pressure.
  3. Important objective, but limited means and freedom of action: successive limited actions, like Hitler between 1935 and 1939.
  4. Great freedom of action but weak means: prolonged total struggle of low military intensity, leading to the adversary’s moral exhaustion.
  5. Strong military means: military victory through the destruction of the enemy’s forces and occupation of its territory. However, the objective remains the opponent’s will. This model only works with a quick victory; otherwise, its cost becomes disproportionate to the stakes.

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For General André Beaufre, strategy is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.” It serves to “achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Strategic reasoning thus combines both material and psychological factors. It is a method of thinking that allows one to direct events rather than merely endure them.


Read also: When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

In Stratégie théorique II (Theoretical Strategy II), General Poirier describes a form of conflict that extends beyond the traditional concept of war under the pressure of nuclear weapons. This state between war and peace is reminiscent of what we now call “hybrid warfare”. Which, by the way, has always existed—but that’s another debate…

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

Competitive Commerce

He introduces the concept of “Integral Strategy” into the theoretical field. In order to achieve their political goals while countering those of their adversaries, sociopolitical actors combine military, economic, and cultural strategies.

The state of conflictual tension without resorting to physical violence, which arises from the clash of different actors’ political goals, is called “competitive commerce.” However, with the advent of nuclear weapons, this state of tension evolves into what the general calls “generalized aggressiveness.”

Also read: Understanding Why, For de Gaulle, General Knowledge Is the True School of Command

Hybrid Warfare or Crisis Maneuver ?

Indeed, due to the prospect of a nuclear confrontation, the realization of a state’s political project is largely deprived of the military dimension of their integral strategy. This results in increased activity and aggressiveness in economic and cultural strategies, but with the obligation to remain “below the critical threshold of open conflict”. This blurs the distinction between peace and war in a “crisis maneuver.”

In this context, military strategy must use “sub-war forms.” Previously, war encompassed military strategy; now, it is merely one of its modalities.

Finally, let’s read the general’s description of this type of conflict. While expressing the reality of the Cold War, he almost exactly describe hybrid warfare:

“Localized and sporadic interventions, with varying degrees of controlled violence (unrest, attacks, sabotage, coups, piracy, terrorism, subversion, etc.) support ideological propaganda and economic pressures that become challenges, with bargaining that no longer hides the fact that it is blackmail.”

—Lucien Poirier, Stratégie théorique II

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See also: Lucien Poirier’s Comprehensive Strategy


Try one of our Clausewitz articles. War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means. Or Clausewitz’s Friction.