Strategy according to General Beaufre’s “Introduction to Strategy”

In Introduction à la stratégie (Introduction to Strategy), French General André Beaufre presents the conclusions of his reflections on strategy in a dense, concise, and clear text.

André Beaufre, introduction to strategy

According to Beaufre, the meaning of the term “strategy” is often misunderstood. Historically, it was the science and art of supreme command, transmitted by example. However, with the evolution of warfare, this empirical transmission became obsolete, giving way to strategic research.

Nevertheless, this research remains inevitably influenced by the conflicts of its time. Only an abstract approach truly allows one to grasp the nature of strategy.

The Purpose of Strategy According to Beaufre

Before defining strategy, one must understand its purpose. Strategy does not unfold in a vacuum; it has a clear goal:

“The purpose of strategy is to achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Beaufre’s Definition of Strategy

Following the purpose, comes the definition. The famous definition of strategy appears early in Beaufre’s work. It is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.”

In war, each side seeks the opponent’s acceptance of the conditions it wishes to impose. Ultimately, it’s about convincing the other that continuing the fight is futile. Strategy thus targets the opponent’s will.

It is by placing a strategic problem within the psychological terrain of the adversary that one can properly assess the decisive factors. Therefore, the goal is to “reach a decision by creating and exploiting a situation that leads to a moral disintegration of the opponent, sufficient to make them accept the conditions one wants to impose.”

Thus, both sides aim simultaneously for the moral disintegration of the other. Strategic action is therefore dialectical: each side seeks to act while countering the actions of the other. Strategy becomes a struggle for freedom of action.

In the final analysis, according to Beaufre, strategy should be considered an art, as it requires the strategist to assess key elements based solely on their judgment. It is impossible to establish a set of rules that would apply in every circumstance.

The Means of Strategy According to Beaufre

Both belligerants choose their means by confronting the possibilities and vulnerabilities of the adversary. The question becomes: who do we want to defeat?

This leads to very concrete questions. For example: is capturing the enemy’s capital essential or not? Is the enemy particularly sensitive to human losses? The goal is to find the best way to achieve moral disintegration. From this confrontation of possibilities and the adversary’s vulnerabilities, a strategic objective emerges.

Strategic “Models”

General Beaufre identifies five strategic “models” based on means and objectives:

  1. Very powerful means for a modest objective: exerting a direct threat (nuclear deterrence).
  2. Modest objective, but insufficient means: limited freedom of action, requiring indirect pressure.
  3. Important objective, but limited means and freedom of action: successive limited actions, like Hitler between 1935 and 1939.
  4. Great freedom of action but weak means: prolonged total struggle of low military intensity, leading to the adversary’s moral exhaustion.
  5. Strong military means: military victory through the destruction of the enemy’s forces and occupation of its territory. However, the objective remains the opponent’s will. This model only works with a quick victory; otherwise, its cost becomes disproportionate to the stakes.

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For General André Beaufre, strategy is “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve their conflict.” It serves to “achieve the objectives set by politics by making the best use of available means.”

Strategic reasoning thus combines both material and psychological factors. It is a method of thinking that allows one to direct events rather than merely endure them.


Read also: When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

In Stratégie théorique II (Theoretical Strategy II), General Poirier describes a form of conflict that extends beyond the traditional concept of war under the pressure of nuclear weapons. This state between war and peace is reminiscent of what we now call “hybrid warfare”. Which, by the way, has always existed—but that’s another debate…

When General Poirier Theorized Hybrid Warfare Before Hybrid Warfare

Competitive Commerce

He introduces the concept of “Integral Strategy” into the theoretical field. In order to achieve their political goals while countering those of their adversaries, sociopolitical actors combine military, economic, and cultural strategies.

The state of conflictual tension without resorting to physical violence, which arises from the clash of different actors’ political goals, is called “competitive commerce.” However, with the advent of nuclear weapons, this state of tension evolves into what the general calls “generalized aggressiveness.”

Also read: Understanding Why, For de Gaulle, General Knowledge Is the True School of Command

Hybrid Warfare or Crisis Maneuver ?

Indeed, due to the prospect of a nuclear confrontation, the realization of a state’s political project is largely deprived of the military dimension of their integral strategy. This results in increased activity and aggressiveness in economic and cultural strategies, but with the obligation to remain “below the critical threshold of open conflict”. This blurs the distinction between peace and war in a “crisis maneuver.”

In this context, military strategy must use “sub-war forms.” Previously, war encompassed military strategy; now, it is merely one of its modalities.

Finally, let’s read the general’s description of this type of conflict. While expressing the reality of the Cold War, he almost exactly describe hybrid warfare:

“Localized and sporadic interventions, with varying degrees of controlled violence (unrest, attacks, sabotage, coups, piracy, terrorism, subversion, etc.) support ideological propaganda and economic pressures that become challenges, with bargaining that no longer hides the fact that it is blackmail.”

—Lucien Poirier, Stratégie théorique II

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See also: Lucien Poirier’s Comprehensive Strategy


Try one of our Clausewitz articles. War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means. Or Clausewitz’s Friction.