Melos or the Risk of Neutrality

The fate of the island of Melos in the Peloponnesian War illustrates the risk to the weak of believing they can remain neutral when the fighting is raging all around them.

Melos or the risk of neutrality

In Book V of the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides presents a dialogue between Athenian ambassadors and Melian notables (V, 84), known as the Melian dialogue, or the dialogue between Athenians and Melians.

Melos is a small island in the Aegean Sea. Its location would allow whoever ruled it to act effectively on maritime traffic. It was therefore a key position for Athens, which depended on the tribute paid by its allies (see our article The thalassocratic system in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War). The city chose to remain neutral in the war that had been raging between Sparta and Athens for 15 years.

Mélos ou les risques de la neutralité - L'empire athénien en 431 av. J.-C., juste avant le début de la guerre du Péloponnèse.
The Athenian Empire in 431 BC, just before the start of the Peloponnesian War. Map_athenian_empire_431_BC-fr.svg : Marsyasderivative work: Once in a Blue Moon, CC BY-SA 2.5, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5, via Wikimedia Commons

In 416 BC, the Athenians felt that the neutrality of this small city represented too great a risk and decided to give it an ultimatum: submit to the Empire or see their city destroyed. After all, the Melians are also Sparta’s colonists. An edifying dialogue ensues between Athenian delegates and Melian notables.

Melos’ neutrality rejected

Melos offered to remain neutral. This argument was immediately rejected by the Athenians.

“your hostility does us less harm than your friendship: the latter would appear in the eyes of the peoples of the empire as proof of weakness, your hatred as proof of power”.

Athens based its power on the tribute it received from its subjugated cities. It therefore had to ensure that it dominated the sea routes. If it accepted that Melos should remain neutral, it opened the door to demands from other island peoples.

The heart of the Melian dialogue: right versus possible

The Athenian delegates began by dismissing the legal argument.

“we’re not going to […] use big words, saying that having defeated the Mede gives us the right to dominate, or that our current campaign stems from an infringement of our rights”.

They intend to rely on power relationships.

“If the law intervenes in human assessments to inspire a judgement when the forces are equivalent, the possible, on the other hand, governs the action of the strongest and the acceptance of the weakest”.

For the Melians, it’s submission or death, whatever their legal position. “Either we prevail in terms of the law, refusing to give in, and it’s war, or […] it’s servitude”.

Destruction of Melos

Strengthened by their right and the divine support that goes with it, the Melians chose to resist despite the power of Athens. They counted on Sparta to come to their aid.

“In the name of their own interests, they will not want to betray Melos, a colony of their own, in order to become suspect to their supporters in Greece and do their enemies a favour.

But Sparta did not make a move. After all, Melos never took their side. Melos’ position was irrational.

“Your strongest support comes from a hope for the future, and your present resources are meagre to successfully resist the forces now arrayed against you”.

After several months of siege, Melos, starving, tried to negotiate its surrender. But the Athenians proved implacable. They subjected the city to extreme violence, even for the time. They slaughtered the men, took the women and children into slavery, and then brought in their own colonists. The fate of Melos left a lasting impression on the Greek world. Because it thought it was choosing honour, relying on neutrality and help of a power that was culturally close to it, it ceased to exist.

Right, morality and power

What conclusion is to be drawn from the Melian dialogue? Not that might makes right. But that despite the rule of law, power relationships do not disappear. They must be taken into account. Morality carries little weight in the face of what a player perceives to be his vital interest. And like promises, alliances are only binding on those who believe them.


Read also Ares and Athena, Gods of War

Why general culture is the true school of command – Charles De Gaulle

In Vers l’armée de métier (1934), Charles de Gaulle explains, with a formula that has remained famous, that general culture is the real school of command. According to him, it is necessary to train the “power of the mind”, and the “intellectual and moral reflexes of leaders”. But in this work, he hardly constructs his thought except on a few pages.

De Gaulle. General Culture true school of command.
Charles de Gaulle (1890 – 1970). Officer, writer, head of state.

He had been much more prolific in The edge of the sword (Le fil de l’épée, 1932). We will use these developments to understand his idea. We will also explain what qualities he thinks a military leader should possess.

Intelligence, instinct, general culture

For Charles de Gaulle, intelligence and instinct are both necessary to action.

War is such a complex domain, involving so many immaterial forces, that it is difficult to grasp it entirely by intelligence. However, even if it does not bring certainty, the intellect reduces the field of error. It brings intelligence, organization, knowledge of its strengths and weaknesses. It “prepares the conception of the action but does not give birth to it”.

Intelligence is complemented by instinct. It is through instinct that man “perceives the reality of the conditions which surround him and experiences the corresponding impulse”. Instinct is a shortcut between the sensible world and action. “Great men of war have always been aware of the role and the value of instinct. »

It is general culture that forms intelligence and instinct. It allows one to structure its thoughts and prepare its mind for decision-making, by clearing the field of possibilities. Substitute to experience, it is also much broader. It is for this reason that according to de Gaulle, “the true school of command is therefore General Culture” , and that “at the bottom of Alexander’s victories, one always finds Aristotle”.

However, general culture is not everything. A military leader needs many other qualities.

Authority

After conception, decision. Authority and courage, moral qualities, complement intelligence and instinct, intellectual qualities, in the great leader.

Decision-making is a moral process, not an intellectual one. It requires courage. Courage is not given to everyone, because of the serious consequences that the decision to be taken may entail. The mind capable of decision must also be accompanied by authority, which is the faculty of having “a grip on souls”.

Authority itself implies “prestige“. Prestige (here similar to charisma) is an innate gift, but certain aspects of it can be developed .

To work on his prestige, the commander must remain mysterious, which requires distancing himself from its subordinates. But this prestige is not inaccessibility, it is the reserve of the soul, of gestures and words, the sobriety of attitude and speech. One must feel in the silence of the leader the contained flame. It is an attitude of a king in exile.

But to maintain what must be called “majesty” (the term does not appear in the book), the leader needs a goal that connects him to greatness. However, greatness represents a weight that cannot be supported by everyone.

Finally, to the virtues of intelligence, instinct and prestige, the great leader has to add character .

The character

Character, “ virtue of difficult times “is the ability to leave its mark on facts.

The man of character inspires, decides and assumes. He has the “ passion of willing”. He is firm, but benevolent, assumes the failures and redistributes the glory. In times of peace, such a man will be perceived as proud and unruly, and he will suffer for it. But let difficulties arise, and they will naturally push him to the fore.

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If “the true school of command is therefore General Culture”, it is because that it prepares the commander for rapid and fair decision-making in the face of an unforeseeable and necessarily confuse situation . It develops the instinct which, alone, makes it possible to feel the direction to give to its choices. But if the general culture forms the instinct of the military leader, the latter must be accompanied by other qualities such as intelligence or authority, both moral and intellectual.

“All great men of action were meditative”

CHARLES DE GAULLE, LE FIL DE L’ÉPÉE.

“The real school of command is therefore general culture. Through it thought is enabled to exercise itself with order, to discern in things the essential from the incidental, to perceive the extensions and the interference, in short to rise to that degree where the ensembles appear without prejudice of nuances. Not an illustrious captain who did not have taste and sense for heritage and human spirit. At the bottom of Alexander’s victories, one always finds Aristotle. »

CHARLES DE GAULLE, VERS L’ARMÉE DE MÉTIER.

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Also read Lucien Poirier’s Comprehensive Strategy.