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Understanding Absolute War and Real War in Clausewitz in Five Minutes

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Absolute war, the realm of the rise to extremes, therefore only exists in theory. In real war, several principles of moderation prevent this rise to extremes.

In Books I and VIII of On War, Clausewitz develops the concept of rise to extremes, as well as those of “absolute” and “real” war.

Absolute war, theoretical war

From the start of Book I, Clausewitz offers a definition of war. It is “an act of force by which we seek to force the adversary to submit to our will”. From there, incapacitating oneself from the enemy becomes an intermediate goal. This is the condition for bending it to our will.

In a purely logical approach, Clausewitz shows that in theory this “act of force” which is war can only go to extremes. It is absolute war (for war taken in the absolute, in its principle).

Three “reciprocal actions” allow the rise to extremes according to Clausewitz.

– Unlimited reciprocal use of force. He who makes the most complete use of it has an advantage over his enemy. The latter is then forced to do the same.

– The search for the overthrow of the adversary. Each of the two camps tries to submit the other to its will. He will therefore try to reduce his enemy to impotence. Neither of them is therefore safe until the other is unable to defend themselves.

– Calculation of the necessary efforts and escalation. Each of the two opponents calculates the efforts that will be necessary to surpass the other. This can only lead to a perpetual gradation leading to extremes.

The rise to extremes is therefore an unlimited use of force. Because of these three “reciprocal actions”, in the world of ideas, the natural movement of war leads to the rise to extremes.

Actual war

However, the theoretical principle of rising to extremes does not apply in actual warfare . Indeed, in real war there are brakes on this rise to extremes.

Real war cannot go to extremes

The belligerents are not abstract entities emerging from nothing for instant confrontation. They know each other, and are able to estimate the will of their opponent. This introduces a first principle of moderation .

Furthermore, war has a duration. An error in estimating the enemy’s will can therefore be repaired. This introduces a second possibility of reciprocal moderation. And even in case of defeat, the result is never final.

There are other obstacles to achieving absolute war. This is the case with human weaknesses such as indecision or imperfection of judgment; or else friction in the conduct of war by state apparatuses. Finally, low stakes can discourage rise to extremes.

Real war has limits

The limits of the use of force in real war will therefore not be positioned at the extremes. They will be determined by calculation, reasoning and probabilities.

These terminals will be placed according to the political goal. It will require more or less significant efforts for one, and will provoke a greater or lesser will to fight in the other.

It is this political goal which will determine the result that military action must achieve.

Absolute war , the realm of the rise to extremes, therefore only exists in theory. In real war, several principles of moderation prevent this rise to extremes. While Clausewitz recognizes that trying to avoid bloodshed in war would go against the essence of war, he does not recommend introducing rise to the extremes of violence into actual war. The rise to extremes is only a theoretical object which is intended to remain so.

However, and this is the usefulness of the theory, this concept must be kept in mind as the natural direction of all war.

Read also Understand why for de Gaulle, general culture is the true school of command

The principle of moderation in war

This leads us to analyze a quote from the master that is often repeated, but often misunderstood:

“it will always be an absurdity to want to introduce a principle of moderation into war.”

On War , p. 28

Taken in this way, it would be the profession of faith of a Clausewitz apostle of the rise to extremes, who would advocate maximum use of force without taking into account the laws and customs of war or the political context. The indiscriminate unleashing of violence would be the only way to win.

Nothing could be more false, nothing more criminal against the thought of the master. Let’s put the quote in context:

“If the wars of civilized peoples are much less cruel and devastating than those of unsophisticated peoples, this is due to the social state of the former and their international relations. War is influenced by this state and these relationships which modify and temper it, but these elements remain foreign to it, a simple external fact , so that it will always be an absurdity to want to introduce a principle of moderation into war.”

On War, p. 28. Emphasis added.

If war taken in theory has no moderating principle and naturally rises to extremes, real war is in fact moderate. However, the moderating element comes not from the nature of war itself, but from its environment. He nonetheless has a very real influence. The maxim which closes our quotation therefore only applies to absolute war. It is anything but a negation of moderation in the reality of war.

This brings us closer to one of the major themes of On War , which is that war should not be considered as an autonomous phenomenon, but as a political phenomenon subject to political decisions. But addressing it here would take us beyond five minutes…

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Thus, if he places violence at the heart of war, both absolute and real, Clausewitz in no way recommends giving free rein to unbridled violence to achieve victory. The rise to extremes is a theoretical object which is not intended to be embodied in real war. The latter is indeed marked by several limitations external to its nature.

“We are thus led to consider war not as it should be according to its concept, but as it is in reality, that is to say with all the foreign elements which are introduced into it and modify it »

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War , Book VIII

EDITOR’S NOTE:

Some authors consider that absolute war could occur in reality, as in the case of nuclear war. In book VIII, Clausewitz himself indicates that the Napoleonic wars brought absolute war to earth.

However, it seems to us that even in the event of an outbreak of extreme violence, a certain number of obstacles would remain. For example, due to the friction that would arise in the units responsible for annihilating opposing cities, such as disagreements, equipment malfunction, hesitation or even refusal to obey. The fact that a war can take an apocalyptic form does not mean that it would be without brakes.

The hypothesis according to which absolute war is an ideal (in the theoretical sense of a pure and perfect form of war) which would serve as a compass to understand the direction taken by real war seems to us the richest. Quite simply, without this the concept of absolute war would not be of much interest.

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See our other articles on Clausewitz.

War as a continuation of politics by other means

The astonishing trinity in Clausewitz, and why the master describes war as a chameleon

Friction in Clausewitz

The center of gravity in Clausewitz

Biography of Carl von Clausewitz

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A short biography of Carl von Clausewitz to complete our articles on “On War”.

Carl von Clausewitz biography
Carl Von Clausewitz
Order On War now

The Beginnings of a Brilliant Strategist

Carl von Clausewitz was born on June 1, 1780, in Burg bei Magdeburg, Prussia, into a family of the minor nobility. His early entry into the Prussian army at the age of 12 marked the beginning of a promising military career. His time at the Berlin Military Academy shaped his convictions, as he was influenced by the revolutionary ideals of France.

On the Battlefield

Carl von Clausewitz was shaped by the Napoleonic Wars. His presence on the European battlefields profoundly influenced his understanding of war and its implications.

At Jena, the Prussian army suffered a crushing defeat against the Napoleonic forces. Clausewitz witnessed the brutal collapse of a military institution he had sworn to serve. This experience confronted him with the ruthless reality of modern warfare.

His participation in the Battle of Waterloo as a Prussian staff officer allowed him to closely observe Napoleon Bonaparte’s strategy and contribute to the French emperor’s final defeat.

These battlefield experiences deeply influenced his strategic thinking. It was in the carnage of war that Clausewitz began to develop the fundamental concepts that would shape his major work, “On War”.

In Service of the Tsar

Following the fall of Prussia, Clausewitz joined Tsar Alexander I of Russia. His commitment to the tsar reflected his growing reputation as a military strategist. This period of his life was marked by efforts to modernize the Russian army. He also advised the tsar on military strategy.

After the War: Development of Clausewitzian Thought

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz dedicated a significant part of his life to furthering his reflection on war and military strategy. He wrote several works and articles that enriched his thinking and expanded his influence. However, his most famous work remains “On War”, albeit unfinished at his death.

Clausewitz‘s Legacy

Clausewitz died of cholera on November 16, 1831, in Breslau, Silesia, at the age of 51. He left behind a lasting legacy in the field of military strategy. His thinking continues to inspire future generations in their understanding of war and international politics. He undoubtedly occupies a place among the greatest military thinkers in history.

Marie von Clausewitz

In conclusion of our biography of Clausewitz, a word about Marie von Clausewitz. Carl’s devoted wife played an essential role in preserving and disseminating her husband’s ideas after his death. Indeed, after Carl’s passing, she took charge of the posthumous publication of “On War”, an unfinished work. Her dedication to spreading Clausewitz’s ideas contributed to solidifying his place among the greatest military thinkers of all time.

Order On War now

After Clausewitz Biography

Also read War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means

Clausewitz’s center of gravity

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The concept of “center of gravity”, developed by Carl von Clausewitz in On War, has had remarkable posterity. Many Western armies use it nowadays.

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Clausewitz center of gravity. Les armes et la toge.

Center of Gravity and Balance

Clausewitz has described what a belligerent’s center of gravity is. It is the point on which an action will affect the rest of one’s war system. It can be considererd as its point of balance, which drives everything else. Acting on the center of gravity will unbalance the opponent. Therefore, they will overthrow him more easily. « A shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect »

The « center of gravity » synthetize physical strength ratio, morale and terrain. « We think, therefore, a theatre of war, whether large or small, with its military force, whatever may be the size of that, represents a unity which maybe reduced to one centre of gravity. At this centre of gravity the decision must take place ».

The destiny of a warring state is therefore linked to its center of gravity. To destroy the enemy’s center of gravity is to bring him to his knees.

However, actions against the enemy’s center of gravity become crucial only if opponents are trying to reach a decision. If the belligerents seek only secondary gains, they will not attempt to overthrow the enemy at the cost of a large and risky effort. Clausewitz speaks of “armed observation”. The blow on the center of gravity’s aim is to bring the enemy down, not to obtain secondary benefits.

Finding Causewtz’s Center of Gravity

Hence, how to identify he enemy’s center of gravity ? Clausewitz here helps his reader, by listing some possible centers of gravity. The army, as it was for Alexander or Frederick II; the capital of a state, if it is in the throes of civil strife; and finally the relief army, in the case of weak belligerents supported by strong allies; “Unity of interests” in a coalition; finally, against a nation in arms, the leaders and the public opinion. The center of gravity can therefore be material or immaterial.

However, this notion is dynamic. Indeed, the center of gravity of a belligerent can change over time.

“If the Germans had reached Paris, in 1792, there—in all human probability—the war with the Revolutionary party would have been brought to an end at once for a season; it was not at all necessary at that time to beat their armies beforehand, for those armies were not yet to be looked upon as potent powers in themselves singly. On the other hand, in 1814, the allies would not have gained everything by taking Paris if Buonaparte had still remained at the head of a considerable army; but as his army had nearly melted away, therefore, also in the year 1814 and 1815 the taking of Paris decided all.”

But can an enemy hold multiple centers of gravity, or only one ? The task of the planner is precisely to reduce all the opposing sources of power into one, which controls all the others. “There are very few cases in which [the] reduction of several centres of gravity to one cannot be made.”

Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity and Economy of Forces

Once the center of gravity identified, Clausewitz recommends focusing efforts on it. “Against this centre of gravity of the enemy, the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed”.

Indeed, center of gravity is a tool to be used by the planner in order to organize his efforts. It allows to focus on the most important task. An army that use part of its forces to occupy a secondary province of its adversary will not threat the balance of the enemy system. That will not be a decisive action. Thus, the forces are spoilt. However, if the opponent’s center of gravity is dislocated, it loses his balance; if it is destroyed, the all what is left to the enmey is to “beg for mercy.”

This doesnt mean that the whole army need to rush toward the gravity point of the ennemy. Secondary missions, such as safety, will always be necessary. However, no more troops should be concentrated there than necessary.

Conversely, the general must calculate correctly the effort to make against the enemy’s center of gravity. Thus secondary, but necessary, operations can be correctly executed.

“Therefore, if on the one hand, the violence with which we wish to strike the blow prescribes the greatest concentration of force, so in like manner, on the other hand, we have to fear every undue excess as a real evil, because it entails a waste of power, and that in turn a deficiency of power at other points.”

In short, identifying the enemy’s center of gravity helps avoid wasting efforts.

Strong Point Against Strong Point ?

The action against the enemy’s center of gravity has attracted some criticism to Clausewitz. For example, Liddell Hart considers that action against the center of gravity leads to an action from strong to strong. Indeed, even a successful direct action against the center of gravity will leave the winner weakened. So weakened, that he will be unable to exploit his opponent’s unbalance.

It is clear that the thought of the Master cannot entirely escape this criticism.

To begin with, Clausewitz does not believe in victory without a fight, even in the case of an intangible center of gravity.

Indeed, whatever the chosen center of gravity, one must disperse opposing armies. “But whatever may be the central point of the enemy’s power against which we are to direct our operations, still the conquest and destruction of his army is the surest commencement, and in all cases, the most essential”.

Then, in several chapters, the center of gravity is the greatest concentration of troops. “The centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect”

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In conclusion, what one should remember from the concept of center of gravity introduced by Clausewitz?

Ultimately, it is a question of identifying what the source of the coherence of the opposing war system is. Neutralizing it will cause the enemy to loose its balance. This will multiply the effects directed against him.

Indeed, the center of gravity is not necessarily the source of power of the opponent, but the source of the cohesion of its different parts. “The armed forces of every belligerent […], have a certain unity, and in that way, connection; but where connection is there come in analogies of the centre of gravity.”

For example, the combat system of Western armies is based on significant firepower, but also and above all on permanent communications. They allow a very fast design – execution loop. Cutting them off dramatically reduces mobility, and therefore the effectiveness of small armies.

As for the Islamic State, its center of gravity was not its armed forces, but its narrative, through which it attracted and recruited. More generally, the center of gravity of a guerrilla may lie in a sanctuary, or in its “external maneuver” (Beaufre). That is, in being able to gain international legitimacy.

Therefore, the notion of center of gravity permit to avoid the action of strong against strong in a sterile physical confrontation. It is useful to concentrate efforts against the keystone of the enemy edifice, without excluding other lines of operations.

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Read also Understanding Clausewitz’s Trinity.