Author Archives: Les armes et la toge

Clausewitz’s Friction

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In Book One of On War, Carl von Clausewitz introduces a famous concept: friction.

Clausewitz's friction : all the little things that will go wrong.
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Clausewitz’s Friction: little things, big problems

Clausewitz’s friction is what makes the simplest things difficult in war. War requires many little individual actions. Difficulties in carrying out each and every one of them tend to accumulate and create chain reactions.

External phenomena such as chance, or the weather, strengthen these chain reactions. More, they are also reinforced by war constraints, such as physical exhaustion or fear. A weapon that malfunctions, a subordinate who misunderstands orders, a vehicle that breaks down, a terrain that does not correspond to the map… Multiplied by the men and equipment of the army, this is the friction.

As a consequence of the friction, it is difficult to calculate one’s own actions. Results might always fall short of expectations. However, ways to conduct the action despite the friction exist.

When reality goes beyond friction

In war, experience and willpower partly compensate friction.

Those with no experience of war will understand the phenomenon of friction with difficulty: “As long as we have no personal knowledge of War, we cannot conceive where those difficulties lie“. The General has to rely on his experience to deal with the friction. It is the only way to estimate with accuracy the results that one can reasonably achieve.


But experience is nothing without an iron will. Indeed, it can also bring to irresolution. “A powerful iron will overcomes this friction; it crushes the obstacles, but certainly the machine along with them.” Indeed, bypassing the phenomenon of friction requires considerable efforts, which an army cannot sustain for long. For example, to achieve greater progression than what would appear mediocre to an uninitiated, a troop had in the past to weaken its men with forced marches. Today, it would have to abandon its broken-down vehicles to maintain its fast pace.

The effort can only be considered as a temporary rise of pain. It’s up to the General to decide when and how long he wants to endure it.

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To sum up, understanding the reality of military action cannot be done without the concept of friction. Ignoring it is a mistake; trying to make it disappear, an illusion: it is consubstantial to war.

“Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

Carl von clausewitz, on war

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Read also Clausewitz’s Trinity

Clausewitz’s center of gravity

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The concept of “center of gravity”, developed by Carl von Clausewitz in On War, has had remarkable posterity. Many Western armies use it nowadays.

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Clausewitz center of gravity. Les armes et la toge.

Center of Gravity and Balance

Clausewitz has described what a belligerent’s center of gravity is. It is the point on which an action will affect the rest of one’s war system. It can be considererd as its point of balance, which drives everything else. Acting on the center of gravity will unbalance the opponent. Therefore, they will overthrow him more easily. « A shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect »

The « center of gravity » synthetize physical strength ratio, morale and terrain. « We think, therefore, a theatre of war, whether large or small, with its military force, whatever may be the size of that, represents a unity which maybe reduced to one centre of gravity. At this centre of gravity the decision must take place ».

The destiny of a warring state is therefore linked to its center of gravity. To destroy the enemy’s center of gravity is to bring him to his knees.

However, actions against the enemy’s center of gravity become crucial only if opponents are trying to reach a decision. If the belligerents seek only secondary gains, they will not attempt to overthrow the enemy at the cost of a large and risky effort. Clausewitz speaks of “armed observation”. The blow on the center of gravity’s aim is to bring the enemy down, not to obtain secondary benefits.

Finding Causewtz’s Center of Gravity

Hence, how to identify he enemy’s center of gravity ? Clausewitz here helps his reader, by listing some possible centers of gravity. The army, as it was for Alexander or Frederick II; the capital of a state, if it is in the throes of civil strife; and finally the relief army, in the case of weak belligerents supported by strong allies; “Unity of interests” in a coalition; finally, against a nation in arms, the leaders and the public opinion. The center of gravity can therefore be material or immaterial.

However, this notion is dynamic. Indeed, the center of gravity of a belligerent can change over time.

“If the Germans had reached Paris, in 1792, there—in all human probability—the war with the Revolutionary party would have been brought to an end at once for a season; it was not at all necessary at that time to beat their armies beforehand, for those armies were not yet to be looked upon as potent powers in themselves singly. On the other hand, in 1814, the allies would not have gained everything by taking Paris if Buonaparte had still remained at the head of a considerable army; but as his army had nearly melted away, therefore, also in the year 1814 and 1815 the taking of Paris decided all.”

But can an enemy hold multiple centers of gravity, or only one ? The task of the planner is precisely to reduce all the opposing sources of power into one, which controls all the others. “There are very few cases in which [the] reduction of several centres of gravity to one cannot be made.”

Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity and Economy of Forces

Once the center of gravity identified, Clausewitz recommends focusing efforts on it. “Against this centre of gravity of the enemy, the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed”.

Indeed, center of gravity is a tool to be used by the planner in order to organize his efforts. It allows to focus on the most important task. An army that use part of its forces to occupy a secondary province of its adversary will not threat the balance of the enemy system. That will not be a decisive action. Thus, the forces are spoilt. However, if the opponent’s center of gravity is dislocated, it loses his balance; if it is destroyed, the all what is left to the enmey is to “beg for mercy.”

This doesnt mean that the whole army need to rush toward the gravity point of the ennemy. Secondary missions, such as safety, will always be necessary. However, no more troops should be concentrated there than necessary.

Conversely, the general must calculate correctly the effort to make against the enemy’s center of gravity. Thus secondary, but necessary, operations can be correctly executed.

“Therefore, if on the one hand, the violence with which we wish to strike the blow prescribes the greatest concentration of force, so in like manner, on the other hand, we have to fear every undue excess as a real evil, because it entails a waste of power, and that in turn a deficiency of power at other points.”

In short, identifying the enemy’s center of gravity helps avoid wasting efforts.

Strong Point Against Strong Point ?

The action against the enemy’s center of gravity has attracted some criticism to Clausewitz. For example, Liddell Hart considers that action against the center of gravity leads to an action from strong to strong. Indeed, even a successful direct action against the center of gravity will leave the winner weakened. So weakened, that he will be unable to exploit his opponent’s unbalance.

It is clear that the thought of the Master cannot entirely escape this criticism.

To begin with, Clausewitz does not believe in victory without a fight, even in the case of an intangible center of gravity.

Indeed, whatever the chosen center of gravity, one must disperse opposing armies. “But whatever may be the central point of the enemy’s power against which we are to direct our operations, still the conquest and destruction of his army is the surest commencement, and in all cases, the most essential”.

Then, in several chapters, the center of gravity is the greatest concentration of troops. “The centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect”

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In conclusion, what one should remember from the concept of center of gravity introduced by Clausewitz?

Ultimately, it is a question of identifying what the source of the coherence of the opposing war system is. Neutralizing it will cause the enemy to loose its balance. This will multiply the effects directed against him.

Indeed, the center of gravity is not necessarily the source of power of the opponent, but the source of the cohesion of its different parts. “The armed forces of every belligerent […], have a certain unity, and in that way, connection; but where connection is there come in analogies of the centre of gravity.”

For example, the combat system of Western armies is based on significant firepower, but also and above all on permanent communications. They allow a very fast design – execution loop. Cutting them off dramatically reduces mobility, and therefore the effectiveness of small armies.

As for the Islamic State, its center of gravity was not its armed forces, but its narrative, through which it attracted and recruited. More generally, the center of gravity of a guerrilla may lie in a sanctuary, or in its “external maneuver” (Beaufre). That is, in being able to gain international legitimacy.

Therefore, the notion of center of gravity permit to avoid the action of strong against strong in a sterile physical confrontation. It is useful to concentrate efforts against the keystone of the enemy edifice, without excluding other lines of operations.

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Read also Understanding Clausewitz’s Trinity.

Understanding Clausewitz’s Trinity

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For Clausewitz, the nature of war is to wear changing forms, because it proceeds from the "wonderful trinity".
French speakers, this way.

In this article we will explain what Clausewitz’s Trinity is, and why he compares war to a chameleon.

In the first chapter of On War, Carl von Clausewitz analyzes the essence of war, in order to develop a unique theory which would explain the diversity of its forms. According to Clausewitz’s theory, the very nature of war is to wear changing forms. He compares war to a chameleon, which appearance changes according to its environment. This is because war is part of politics, and also because it proceeds from the “Wonderful Trinity”.

War is the instrument of politics

The first factor which brings about the perpetual change in the form of war, is its submission to politics. War is the “continuation of politics by other means,” as the immortal formula expresses it.

Indeed, if it is the instrument of politics, the form of war will depend, first of all, upon the motives of the conflict. Depending on their importance, they will excite or appease both camps passions.

Second, the form of war rely on its pre-existing conditions. The two adversaries do not raise ex nihilo. They already have political connections, which will influence their mutual perceptions and therefore the shape of the war to come.

“Wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed”

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, BOOK I, §27

It is by analyzing this singular political character of a singular war that one can determine what form it will take. But one must also understand that war equally proceeds from the “wonderful trinity”.

Clausewitz’s wonderful trinity

The second factor which make the form of the war change is the “wonderful trinity,” upon which Clausewitz concludes Chapter I of On War.

War proceeds from three distinct parts of a trinity: “blind instinct”, “free activity of the soul” and “reason”.

War is the manifestation of “blind instinct”, “hatred and animosity”, passions quick to ignite. These characteristics are associated with the people and the “original violence” of war.

But war is also “free activity of soul”, because it is subject to the “play of probability and chance”, within which the warlike virtues of the army and the talent of the general can be expressed to various degrees.

Finally, war “belongs purely to the reason,” since it is directed by politics. The government rationally chooses its goals.

People, army, government; instinct, soul, reason; passions, virtue, intelligence: this is the wonderful trinity from which war proceeds.

However, each of these variables has its own strength and its own intensity, depending on the conflict. As war takes its form according to the ever different relationships between the elements of the trinity, this form is therefore perpetually changing.

Letter and Spirit of the “Wonderful Trinity”

The three parts of Clausewitz’s trinity should not be taken to be strictly separate. The people may very well be armed, or the general may also be the head of the state. But their separation allows the identification of the main elements which will give a specific war its specific form.

With our contemporary theoretical tools, we could try to characterize the form of a conflict by analyzing its actors’ sociology, culture and politics. And this, even if the people and the army are merged, if the “army” is irregular or if the goals of war are thought to be irrational.

Clausewitz’s Trinity : a salutary reminder of the reality of war

It is the nature of war to wear ever-changing forms. This, because it obeys a political purpose, takes place in a specific context, and is conducted under the auspices of a singular combination of the wonderful trinity.

We could have stopped there. However, this simple conclusion, that the nature of war is to possess an ever-changing form, leads to further reflection for practitioners.

The war to fight will never be the war we have studied, prepared for, trained for. Even if we can try to predict what form it will take, or better, to invent this future form, this will never lead to the war we have prepared.

Hence, military commanders’ training should not aim to implement a doctrine, but to adapt this doctrine to real conditions, always anticipated, but each and every time unexpected. There is only one way: train your instinct; and one imperative: have young leaders, endowed with the intellectual plasticity necessary to question their certainties when these certainties collide with reality. Because they will.

“We will be lost if we turn in on ourselves; saved, only, if we train our brains hard, to know better and imagine quicker. “

MARC BLOCH, L’ETRANGE DEFAITE, 1940

Is imagination the most important quality for a military commander?